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ABSTRACT 
 
The Female College Boom, Educational Mobility, and Overeducation 
 
by 
 
Vedant Koppera 
 
In this work I present three essays related to the rising number of female college 
graduates relative to men, intergenerational mobility in education, and the prevalence of 
overeducated workers during the great recession.   
In the first chapter co-authored with Associate Professor Aashish Mehta (UC Santa 
Barbara), we ask whether shifting male and female employment patterns can help to explain 
why the US college boom between 1981 and 2005 was dominated by women.  We make 
three contributions.  First, we show that while a massive feminization of high-wage, high-
skill occupations plausibly contributed to the female college boom, general, structural 
movements of labor (undifferentiated by gender) from industrial work into education-
intensive services should have encouraged male rather than female college attendance.  
Previous work has suggested that both types of employment shifts would have contributed to 
the female college boom. Second, we show that women’s occupational upgrading was too 
large and ubiquitous to be explained by their growing educational advantage. This is 
consistent with a causal connection running from gendered employment trends to a female 
college boom. Third, we show that gender specializations in many occupations deepened, 
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with college educated women gravitating towards jobs offering institutionally protected 
wages. 
In the second chapter, I estimate the intergenerational transmission of education in the 
United States between 1980 and 2013.  I find that intergenerational persistence in education 
has increased substantially among blacks in recent years while remaining stable among 
whites and Hispanics.  I observe this trend when using data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics as well as the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth.  I demonstrate that much 
of the increase in educational persistence among blacks is due to decreases in upward 
mobility.  The increase in black educational persistence is found in both two-parent and 
single-parent households, and I do not find similar trends and differences when estimating 
intergenerational income persistence. 
In the third and final chapter, I use the method introduced by Gottschalk and Hansen 
(2003) to analyze the rate of overeducation among workers with exactly a college degree 
between 2006 and 2013.  To my knowledge, this is the first study to use this method to 
analyze trends in overeducation during the great recession in the U.S.  I find that the 
proportion of workers with exactly a college degree working in occupations offering low 
college premiums  increased during great recession and fell afterwards.  An increase in the 
rate in overeducation could be due to more college-educated workers working in noncollege 
occupations that were noncollege in the past or because there was an increase in the number 
of noncollege occupations.  I show that changes in the rate of overeducation are mostly due 
mostly to the latter.  When shutting the down the flexibility for occupations to change from 
college to noncollege (and vice versa), the rate of overeducation increases only slightly 
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between 2006 and 2013.  Regardless, these findings run contrary to the secular decline of the 
rate of overeducation during the end of 20th century documented by previous research. 
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Gendered Employment Trends and the Female College Boom 
Vedant Koppera, Aashish Mehta * 
(University of California-Santa Barbara) 
July 9, 2014 
Abstract 
We ask whether shifting male and female employment patterns can help to explain why 
the US college boom between 1981 and 2005 was dominated by women.  We make three 
contributions.  First, we show that while a massive feminization of high-wage, high-skill 
occupations plausibly contributed to the female college boom, general, structural movements 
of labor (undifferentiated by gender) from industrial work into education-intensive services 
should have encouraged male rather than female college attendance.  Previous work has 
suggested that both types of employment shifts would have contributed to the female college 
boom. Second, we show that women’s occupational upgrading was too large and ubiquitous 
to be explained by their growing educational advantage. This is consistent with a causal 
connection running from gendered employment trends to a female college boom. Third, we 
show that gender specializations in many occupations deepened, with college educated 
women gravitating towards jobs offering institutionally protected wages. 
Keywords: Women, College Premium, Employment, Occupation 
JEL Codes: J21, J16, I21, J24 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The US college boom has been dominated by women.  The share of female workers, aged 
25-30 holding college degrees rose rapidly, from 25.6% in 1981 to 37.2% in 2005. 
Meanwhile, the corresponding male share edged up from 24.3% to 26%.  Given that 
universities charge men and women equal fees, this suggests that demand for college 
education has grown much faster amongst women than amongst men.  With the college wage 
premium rising for both men and women (Goldin and Katz, 2009), it is useful to ask why 
women have attended college in such numbers while men have not.  Previous studies provide 
several explanations, which mostly involve gender differences in abilities, familial 
responsibilities and labor force participation trends.1  This paper focuses on a different 
possibility: that shifts of male and female employment across industries and occupations 
(henceforth, “sectors”) may have increased the benefits of college education more for women 
than for men.   
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
                                                 
1There are three prominent explanations for this. First, women are often better prepared 
academically and psychologically for higher education than  men, which should make their 
attendance rates more responsive to increases in college premiums (Becker et al., 2010; DiPrete and 
Buchman, 2013; Goldin et al., 2006; Perkins, 2004).  There is also evidence that women’s academic 
advantage has grown in recent decades (Cho, 2007).  Second, given that women bear the majority of 
the cost of raising children post-separation, rising rates of divorce increase the incentives for women 
go to college to ensure that they will have the means to take care of themselves and their children 
(Bronson, 2013).Third, improvements in family planning technology have lifted female labor force 
participation rates (Bailey, 2006), possibly encouraging more women to invest in college in order to 
take advantage of high labor market returns to education (Goldin et al., 2006). 
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The literature identifies two types of employment shifts that may have had this effect.  
The first type involves changes in gender representation within industries and occupations.  
The key shift of this type is an increase in the representation of women in high-skill, high-
wage occupations (McDaniel et al., 2011). Figure 1 clearly shows that, on average, women 
have moved into better paying occupations while men have not.  Figure 2 shows that this has 
resulted in a massive feminization of higher-wage jobs between 1981 and 2005: on average, 
the change in the share of each occupation that was comprised of women increases by 19.5 
percentage points with each doubling of the average occupational wage.  The second type of 
shift involves structural changes, arising from the growth and decline of employment (not 
differentiated by gender) in different sectors. For example, deindustrialization and the 
accompanying shift of workers into services may have generated larger incentives for women 
to attend college, because services tend to employ women and college graduates more 
intensively than manufacturing.  Goldin et al. (2006) argue that shifts in gender 
representation within sectors and structural employment shifts both contributed to the female 
college boom.2  In this study we carefully examine these two explanations.3   
                                                 
2 Specifically, they note that one shift since World War II that “greatly increased the pecuniary 
return to women’s higher education… was a large shift in female employment out of the most 
traditionally female occupations such as teaching and into many previously male-dominated jobs” (p. 
151), and that (p. 152) this was “reinforced, first in the 1960s, but especially since 1980, by a rising 
college wage premium and by secular labor demand shifts favoring occupations and industries 
disproportionately employing college-educated workers, particularly female college graduates (Katz 
& Murphy, 1992).” 
3 Cho (2007) shows that aggregate employment shifts across industries cannot explain the female 
college boom.   We go further by analyzing the effects of gendered employment shifts, as well as the 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
We will make three contributions to the literature on gendered education and employment 
trends. The first contribution is to examine, using decomposition methodologies, whether 
shifts in pooled and gender-specific sectoral employment shares were large enough and in the 
right direction to help explain why the college boom was dominated by women.   Pooled 
employment shares are measured from samples that pool men and women, while gender-
specific employment shares are measured after splitting our samples by gender. Shifts in 
pooled employment shares capture structural changes, while shifts in gender-specific 
employment shares capture the combined effects of structural changes and changes in 
gender-representation within sectors.  Differences in the explanatory power of gender 
specific and pooled employment trends shed light on the role of changing gender 
representation within sectors. 
We start with standard between-within sector decompositions of the changes in the 
utilization of male and female college graduates (Katz and Autor, 1999). We find that women 
have moved into high-skill occupations far faster than men, and that these employment trends 
account for 45-58% of gender differences in college attainment over time. Next, recalling 
that women have shifted into higher paying occupations while men have not, we conduct 
between-within sector decompositions of the shift in the male and female college wage 
premiums. Similar to the previous exercise, we find that women’s occupational shifts were 
larger than men’s and should have done more to lift women’s college premiums than to lift 
                                                                                                                                                       
role of occupational change, and the effects on the college premium of movements of workers 
between low and high-wage sectors.  
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men’s college premiums. Thus, we argue that gender-specific employment trends went in the 
right direction to help account for the fact that women attended college in greater numbers 
than men.  On the other hand, both exercises show that pooled employment trends do not 
shed light on why women went to college more than men.  We reconfirm this negative claim 
using Katz and Murphy’s (1992) between-sector demand shift index, which actually predicts 
a slight male college boom on the basis of pooled employment trends. Deindustrialization 
reduced demand for high-school educated men, which should have encouraged more men to 
attend college.4 
Our second contribution, given that the feminization of high-paying occupations is 
important, is to ask and answer an obvious question.  Couldn’t these occupational shifts 
simply be a consequence of women’s growing educational advantage? If this were the case, 
no causality could run back from shifting gendered employment opportunities to the female 
college boom. We provide three types of evidence that this is not the case. First, we show 
that female occupational upgrading and male occupational stagnation are observed even 
when we limit our samples to workers with exactly the same level of education.  Second, a 
two-stage regression analysis shows that, no matter how occupations’ pay-scales are adjusted 
for the education levels of the workers they employ, higher-paying occupations feminized 
                                                 
4 Diprete and Buchman (2013) hypothesize that structural shifts should have favored a male 
rather than a female college boom. Ours may be the first paper to test this idea.  Our results 
complement those from Weinberg (2000) that computerization within sectors would also have 
encouraged a male college boom by decreasing the demand for male high-school graduates more than 
for female high-school graduates. 
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more rapidly than lower-paying occupations.  This trend also is observed within groups of 
workers with equal education levels.  Third, we show that women moved into high paid 
occupations much faster than their pace of educational advancement would have predicted.  
Conversely, modest improvements in male educational attainment predict some movement of 
men into high-wage jobs, but roughly none is observed. Thus, much of the female 
occupational upgrading is unlikely to be due to educational upgrading. This is consistent with 
a causal connection running from gendered employment trends to a female college boom. 
Our final contribution is to identify the industries and occupations that may have driven 
the college boom by offering better job opportunities to college graduates. We show that the 
representation of women in these key sectors grew rapidly, and that some of these changes 
deepened gender specialization in occupations.  In particular, we show that while male 
college attendance was sustained by employment in financial services, healthcare and 
education played this role for women.  Moreover, college-educated women were 
disproportionately drawn to jobs offering institutionally protected wages, even as men were 
edged out of them.  Thus, we show that men and women have utilized higher education in 
very different ways in the labor market, and that gender-specific employment trends are 
potentially useful to consider when attempting to explain why the college boom has been a 
predominantly female phenomenon. 
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DATA 
Our data come from the Current Population Survey, survey years 1982 and 2006 (King et 
al., 2010).  We created two samples, a count sample to capture total labor supply and a nested 
wage sample that captures the wages of all full-time workers in the United States.  The 
creation of these samples closely follows the methodology of Katz and Murphy (1992).  The 
count sample includes only workers who have worked at least one week in the preceding 
year, including immigrants.  We calculated an individual’s annual hours worked by 
multiplying weeks worked and usual weekly hours.  Starting in 1992, the years of schooling 
variable was reported in multi-grade brackets.  For individuals whose schooling levels are 
reported this way, we impute years of schooling at the middle grade level of their bracket.  
We calculate work experience based on schooling and age, and drop workers with more than 
40 years of experience.   
The wage sample excludes self-employed and unpaid family workers.  It includes only 
full time wage and salary workers who were in the labor force for at least 39 weeks, and 
worked at least one week in the previous year.  We also excluded individuals who did not 
work part of the previous year due to school, retirement, or military service. Our wage 
measure is log-weekly wages in 1999 dollars.  Top-coded incomes are multiplied by 1.45 
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following the methodology of Katz and Murphy (1992).5  Also following their trimming 
procedures, we dropped individuals who reported a weekly income of less than $115.24 in 
1999 dollars (matching their cutoff of $67 a week in 1982 dollars).   
 
COLLEGE ATTAINMENT AND COLLEGE PREMIUMS 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows the percentage of workers with at least a college education, a post-college 
education, and the college premium by demographic group in 1981 and 2005.  We define six 
demographic groups by sex and three experience levels: low (2-8 years); medium (9-16 
years) and high (17-23 years).  The attainment rates are calculated from the quantity sample, 
while the college premium is calculated from the wage sample.  
The table shows that the higher-education boom was overwhelmingly female. College 
and post-college attainment rose far faster amongst women than amongst men in every 
demographic group.  By 2005 low experience female workers were 35% more likely to hold 
a college degree than low experience men (35.9% vs. 26.5%), and 51% more likely to hold a 
post-college degree. 
                                                 
5 Top-coding occurs only in the 1982 survey, where approximately 1% of the male population 
had top-coded incomes compared to .04% for the female population.  Trimming the wage sample by 
dropping men/women in the top and bottom 1% of the male/female wage distribution does not 
qualitatively alter our findings. 
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We conceive of the college premium as a convenient measure of wage difference 
between workers who have obtained a college education and those who have not. We define 
it simply as the difference in average log-wages between workers with a college degree or 
higher, and workers with only a high school degree. Including workers with graduate 
education in the pool of college educated workers will allow us to investigate whether the 
female college boom is related to the growing importance of higher-paying jobs that may 
require post-college credentials.   
College premiums for all three experience groups in 1981 were higher amongst women 
than men.  Amongst low experience workers, the premium increased by a similar amount for 
both genders.  Given that women and men pay the same direct costs for post-secondary 
education,  this shared trend may indicate, consistent with the narrative thread of this paper, 
that younger women experience fewer social restrictions on their educational and work 
choices than older women did (Becker et al., 2010). Amongst medium and high experience 
workers, women also earned a higher premium in 1981, but this difference is completely 
reversed by 2005.  Among medium and high-experience workers, the college premium 
increased much more for men than for women.  This adds to the mystery of the female 
college boom – if male and female workers are fairly close substitutes, one might have 
expected the college boom to be disproportionately male. 
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The remainder of this paper asks whether shifts in employment across sectors account for 
gendered trends in college attainment.  To keep our tables small, we will present results only 
for low and high experience workers.6  The results of all of our analyses for the medium 
experience workers fall in between those for the low and high experience group, with a 
tendency to resemble the results for the high experience group more closely.  This suggests 
that our findings are detecting accelerating trends.  
 
BETWEEN-WITHIN ANALYSES 
We begin analyzing the relationship between employment trends and the college boom 
using decomposition analyses with complementary strengths and weaknesses.  The first is a 
standard shift-share analysis of the increase in college attainment (Autor et al., 1998; Berman 
et al., 1994).  The second is a decomposition capturing how changes in employment 
opportunities should have influenced the college premium itself (Mehta et al., 2013). While 
the first approach directly accounts for increases in the quantity of college graduates, it does 
not involve any wage information. It therefore cannot shed light on how employment shifts 
from low- to high-paying jobs of equal education intensity may have increased the wage 
incentives to attend college.  The latter approach illuminates the connections between 
employment shifts and incentives, but is mute on how many attend college in response to 
these changing incentives.  In combination, the two approaches carry one robust message: 
                                                 
6 Tables including results for medium experience workers are available on request. 
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gender-specific employment trends supported a largely female college boom, while pooled 
employment trends did not. Finally, we will show that a third, influential between-within 
decomposition of the relative demand for college graduates that suppresses gender 
differences in employment trends (Autor et al., 1998; Katz and Murphy, 1992) cannot shed 
light on the gender composition of the college boom. 
 
Effects of employment shifts towards college intensive sectors. 
Denote the share of employed workers in some demographic group (defined by age and 
sex) who have completed at least a college education by , the within-sector analog of this 
share by , and sectors’ employment shares by .  Time differencing these variables (Δ), 
and measuring their levels by the average of their start and end values, the change over time 
in the employment of college graduates can be decomposed as follows: 
(1)  
This identity provides an account of how the net influx of college-educated labor was 
absorbed into employment.  Sector contributions to absorbing the net influx are large 
when a sector is college intensive and grows, (i.e.  is big), or when it is large and its 
college intensity rises, (i.e.  is large).  Large between-sector shifts arise when 
γ
sγ ( )sP
( ) ( ) ∑∑∑ ≡∆+∆≡∆
s
s
s
s
s
s sPsP θγγγ

ShiftSectorWithinShiftSectorBetween
( )sθ
( )sPs∆γ
( ) ssP γ∆
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employment in more college intensive sectors grows faster than employment in less college 
intensive sectors, so that the net influx of college graduates could be absorbed without raising 
college-intensity within sectors.  If between-sector shifts can account for the bulk of the net 
influx of college graduates in each demographic group this suggests that employment shifts 
into college-intensive sectors created additional demand for college graduates that can 
explain rising college attainment in that group. Table 2 shows the between-sector component 
of decomposition (1) for four demographic groups within the count sample. It provides the 
between-sector shifts in college attainment under several industrial and occupational 
classifications, and the total shift to be explained .   
[Table 2 about here] 
The first four columns calculate between-sector shifts using the employment shifts,  
actually experienced by the demographic group in question (i.e using gender-specific shifts).  
Three important trends stand out.  First, occupational change absorbed many more college-
educated women than men at any level of occupational disaggregation.  For example, 4.2 out 
of a 9.4 percentage point gender difference in the increase in college attainment amongst 
low-experience workers can be attributed arithmetically to gender-specific shifts across ten 
industries and 17 occupations. Thus, 45% of the gender difference in college attainment 
among low experience workers can be accounted for by the fact that women moved into 
college-intensive sectors faster than men. This figure rises to 58% among high experience 
( )γ∆
( )sP∆
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workers. In fact, among high-experience males, gender-specific shifts between disaggregated 
occupation groups would have reduced the employment of college graduates.  
Second, amongst young males, between-occupation shifts are approximately as large as 
the observed increase in college attainment.  This implies that male employment shifts 
between-occupations provide an almost complete account of the male college expansion, 
leaving little need to invoke within-sector shifts (such as those arising out of skill-biased 
technological change) to explain why male college attainment rose.7  Third, between-sector 
employment shifts account for more than half of the college expansion amongst young 
women. 
The gender-specific employment trends whose effects we have just examined reflect a 
combination of two sets of changes: structural changes, such as those resulting from 
deindustrialization and the growth of the services economy, which would result in a general 
reallocation of workers in some experience group across sectors; and changes in the gender-
mix within sectors.  The last four columns of Table 2 focus on the former, structural shifts by 
measuring  after pooling genders in each experience cohort (i.e. using shifts in the 
employment distribution of all workers in an experience group, not shifts specific to men and 
women in that experience group).  If the female college boom was driven by a general 
                                                 
7 One of the few papers providing evidence connecting changes in production technology to the 
female college boom (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010) shows that in West Germany computerization 
changed the task composition of work similarly for men with low, medium and high education levels.  
This suggests that technology would not have lifted relative demand for highly-educated men.  They 
provide stronger evidence that technology boosted skill demand amongst women. 
( )sP∆
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growth of college- and female-intensive jobs (due to the expansion of services employment, 
for example), we would expect similar gender differences in the results in the last four 
columns as in the first four.  Instead, the gender differences in the between shifts are 
conspicuously missing from the last four columns. If anything, they appear to run in the 
wrong direction: the pooled employment shifts would have absorbed a slightly larger influx 
of male than of female college graduates.   
Together, the results in Table 2 are consistent with the notion that a feminization of 
education-intensive jobs, not structural change, has supported the female college boom. 
Effects of employment shifts between low-wage and high-wage sectors. 
The preceding approach only considers the effects of rising employment shares of 
education-intensive sectors on the college boom.  However, movements between low- and 
high-wage sectors of equal education intensity may have played a role as well.  Consider, for 
example, the shift that would have occurred as new cohorts of female college graduates were 
able to enter supervisory positions, instead of the lower-paying secretarial pool.  Other things 
equal, this would boost the female college premium and the incentive for women to attend 
college.  Yet, if female secretaries and supervisors were equally likely to hold college 
degrees, a one for one substitution of secretaries with supervisors would not cause a net 
between-sector shift in identity (1). 
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We therefore employ a simple thought experiment to examine the effects of such shifts 
on incentives to attend college. Ignoring the non-pecuniary costs and non-wage benefits of 
post-secondary education, we consider a potential college attendee who must survey the 
likely employment landscape and decide whether to go to college or not.  Other things equal, 
they are more likely to do so if it improves their odds of obtaining employment in a high-
wage sector, or if, conditional on finding employment in some sector, it raises the wage they 
are likely to earn.  Thus, as employment shifts towards sectors that pay well and favor 
college-educated workers in hiring, or towards those that pay the college-educated 
substantially more than high-school graduates, the incentive to obtain higher-education 
becomes stronger.  Given that the direct financial costs of higher education are similar for 
men and women, we will ask whether the inter-sector employment shifts experienced by men 
and women of different cohorts were of the right sign and magnitude to have done more to 
incentivize women than men to attend college.   
Denote average log-wages among some group of workers at a point in time by , 
employment shares , and college and high-school by c and h respectively. Restrict the 
sample to high-school graduates (h, workers with exactly twelve years of school) or with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher (c).   The college premium in some demographic group 
can then be expressed as the difference of the employment-weighted average 
of the log wages earned in each sector by college graduates  and high-school graduates
w
( )P
( )hc ww −≡β
( )csw ,
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: . Defining the sector-specific college premium,
, algebraic manipulation yields: 
(2)   
This says that a sector’s contribution to the college premium  will be large if the 
sector pays high base wages and is more likely to hire a college than a high-school graduate 
(the first summation), or if it hires many college graduates and offers them much higher 
wages than it offers to high-school graduates (the second). Growth in the unconditional 
employment share of such a sector should increase the college premium, other things equal. 
To capture this, define a sector’s per-job contribution to the college premium:
.  This allows us to express (2) as . Time-differencing this 
identity yields:  
(3)  
This says that the college premium increases either due to labor reallocations between 
sectors towards those offering high per-job contributions, or because of changes in the 
relative pay and utilization of college graduates within sectors.   
( )hsw , ∑∑ −≡
s
hs
s
cs whsPwcsP ,, )|()|(β
( )hscss ww ,, −≡β
[ ][ ] ∑∑∑ ≡+−−≡ s ss shhss CcsPwwhsPcsP ββ )|()|()|( ,
( )sC
( )sPCC ss ≡
~ ( )∑≡
s
sCsP
~β
( ) ( )

ShiftSectorWithin
~
ShiftSectorBetween
~ ∑∑ ∆+∆≡∆
s
s
s
s CsPsPCβ
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[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents the between-sector components of identity (3) using several sector 
classifications.   The bottom row presents the observed total shift in the college premium, as 
reported in Table 1.  To allow for gender differences in education levels and pay within 
sectors, the per-job contributions, , are in all cases estimated for the demographic group in 
question.  As in Table 2, the first four columns of Table 3 provide results when we measure 
 using demographic-specific shifts in employment shares across sectors, and the latter 
four columns provide results when  is measured for all wage workers in that cohort 
(i.e. pooling men and women). 
The results are similar to those in Table 2.  The first four columns show that gender-
specific occupational changes would have generated larger increases in the college premium 
for women than for men, suggesting that gendered employment trends would have increased 
the incentive to attend college much faster amongst women.  Indeed, between-occupation 
shifts account for between 70% and 84% of the observed shift in the college premium for 
women, and even shifts between three broad occupation groups can account for around 60% 
of the rise in the college premium for women of both cohorts.  The much smaller between-
occupation shifts for men are consistent with the possibility that an inability to shift into 
high-paying occupations depressed male college attendance rates. Gender-specific 
sC
~
( )sP∆
( )sP∆
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occupational changes therefore plausibly increased the incentive to attend college more for 
women than for men. 
Pooled employment shifts predict very similar shifts in the college premium for women 
and men (the last four columns of Table 3).  This again suggests that structural employment 
trends cannot explain why the college boom was mostly female. 
Between-sector shifts in relative skill demand 
Katz and Murphy (1992) study the relative supply and demand for skilled workers. To do 
so, they assume that equally educated and experienced workers earn the same wage in all 
sectors. This permits them to impute the percentage shift in demand for college equivalent 
relative to high-school equivalent labor  from the percentage shift in the relative supply 
of college graduates, the percentage shift in the college premium, and the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor . Let E denote total employment in 
efficiency units, with labor of two types: college-equivalent (c) and high-school equivalent 
(h).  Formally,  is imputed as follows: 
(4a)   
The between sector percentage shift in the demand for some subgroup of workers, k, 
identified by experience, sex and education, is defined as: 
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(4b)  ,  
This is the subgroup’s employment-share-weighted average of the growth rates of 
employment in each sector.  Demand for subgroup k workers grows if sectors that they tend 
to be employed in grow faster than sectors that they are less frequently employed in.  Thus, 
for example, growth in elementary education boosts demand for female college graduates, 
and the demise of manufacturing jobs reduces demand for male high-school graduates.  We 
note that wage differences between sectors do not factor into between-sector shifts in this 
scheme (i.e. replacing secretarial with supervisory work has no effect on demands for 
college-educated women); and that sectors’ employment growth rates ( )xs EE∆  are only 
calculated for the overall labor force (i.e. these are not gender-specific shifts). 
Proceeding further, between-sector shifts in the demand for subgroups can be aggregated, 
and these aggregates can then be differenced to yield estimates of the shifts in demand for 
one group of workers relative to another.  Thus, for example,  can be decomposed as: 
 (4c)  
Under these definitions, shifts between industries and occupations account for roughly 
1/3 of the estimated shift in the relative demand for skilled labor in the US between 1967 and 
1987 (Katz and Murphy, 1992).  Similar figures have been reported from several other 
countries and time periods (Kijima, 2006; Mehta and Mohr, 2012; Sanchez-Paramo and 
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Schady, 2003).  These between-sector shifts are smaller than the increase in the supply of 
college graduates, so that the college premium would have fallen unless there was some other 
source of higher skills demand.  This type of analysis must therefore invoke large residual 
within-sector increases in skilled labor demand to explain why college premiums rose rather 
than fell. 8   
Table 4 updates this exercise for the years 1981-2005.9  We begin with the relative 
demand for college graduates of either gender (row 9).  Given an approximately 25% 
increase in the overall college premium over this period (not shown), 20.3% increase in the 
relative supply, and the standard assumption that , equation (4a) implies a 55.3% shift 
in the relative demand for college graduates (of either gender).  Between-industry shifts in 
relative demand (21.8%) account for roughly 40% of this increase in relative demand, and 
shifts between industries and occupations (9.5%) account for less than half that.  Once again, 
                                                 
8 This between-sector index underestimates the true rightwards shift in relative skill demand 
when applied to a period of rising skill premiums.  However, correcting for this movement along the 
demand curve using typical values of σ does not alter the qualitative results just stated. 
9 We split the workforce in 320 cells defined by sex, four education classes (<12 years of 
schooling, 12 years, 13-15 years, >=16 years), and 40 experience categories.  We then scaled 
the total hours supplied by all workers within a cell by the time-averaged relative wages of 
workers in these cells.  We then aggregated these supplies of efficiency labor units up to 8 
sex-education supply cells.  Next, we measured the time-averaged utilization of labor in 
efficiency units from each of these 8 aggregated supply cells in 170 industry-occupation cells 
and the total efficiency labor units utilized in each year in each sector.  We used these 
measures to calculate between sector demand shifts for the 8 supply cells (Equation 4b).  We 
defined high-school as those workers with 12 or fewer years of schooling, and college as 
workers with 13 or more years of schooling.  Table 5 provides the supply and demand shifts 
by high-school and college, separately by gender and for the entire population. 
 
4.1=σ
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this suggests that between sector employment shifts should have raised demand for college 
education more among men than women. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Comparing between-shifts in rows 4 and 5 to those in rows 2 and 1 respectively, we find 
that pooled employment trends should have increased demand for female relative to male 
workers of both education levels. Employment trends should also have generated sharp 
reductions in demand for high-school educated men (row 1), but not for high-school educated 
women (row 4); along with smaller gender differences in the shifts in demand for the 
college-educated (rows 2 and 5).  This decline in demand for high-school educated men 
should have generated larger increases in the relative demand for college amongst men (row 
3), than amongst women (row 6). This finding is consistent with the argument that the 
demise of high-wage but low-skill, male-dominated manufacturing jobs should have 
increased the demand for college education more amongst men than amongst women 
(DiPrete and Buchman, 2013).  Gender differences in the between-sector shifts in relative 
skills demand predicted by structural employment trends go in the wrong direction to account 
for the female college boom.   
To sum up, our results so far are consistent with the possibility that gender-specific 
employment trends help to explain why the college boom was disproportionately female.  
Conversely, they show that pooled employment trends cannot account for the increase in 
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relative demand for college-educated labor, and shed no light on why it was overwhelmingly 
met by women.  Thus the female college boom was plausibly driven in part by a more rapid 
occupational upgrading amongst women than amongst men. 
 
WOMEN’S OCCUPATIONAL UPGRADING CANNOT BE ENTIRELY 
EXPLAINED BY THEIR GROWING EDUCATIONAL ADVANTAGE. 
The results thus far show that gender-specific employment shifts were large, and in the 
right direction to help explain the female college boom.  However, as we have already noted, 
the direction of causality is unclear.  Women may have gone to college because high-wage, 
high-skill jobs became more open to hiring women.  Yet, it is also possible that these jobs 
opened up to women simply because they pulled ahead of men in educational attainment. 
While some causality likely runs in the latter direction, this section provides evidence that 
women’s occupational upgrading was far too rapid and too pervasive to be entirely attributed 
to their growing educational advantage over men.  This is consistent with a causal connection 
running from gendered employment trends to gendered educational trends. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
We begin by showing that women have moved more rapidly than men into jobs that offer 
higher wages to equally educated workers.  Figures 3a-b show that amongst post-college 
educated workers (those with a Master’s, professional or doctoral degree, or with 18+ years 
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of schooling), women moved into higher wage occupations, while men did not.  Figures 3c-d 
show that among college educated workers (amongst those with a Bachelor’s degree or 16 -
17 years of schooling) women moved into higher-wage occupations, while men moved into 
lower-wage occupations.  Figures 3e-f also show that male high-school graduates moved into 
occupations that pay high-school graduates less, while the outcomes for female college 
graduates polarized, with the distribution shifting to the right above the 40th percentile. Thus, 
female occupational upgrading is observed within every educational class.  Changes 
observed within educational classes are difficult to attribute to educational upgrading. 
We now consider the possibility that these shifts in the cumulative distributions were 
driven by a handful of occupations. We rule out this possibility using several variants of a 
two-stage regression framework, which shows that the feminization of high-paying jobs is a 
pervasive and robust phenomenon.  In the first stage we use data from 1981, regressing 
workers’ log-wages on a set of up to 254 occupation dummies (excluding the constant term). 
The dependent variable in the second stage is the change, between 1981 and 2005, in the 
share of workers in that occupation who are female.  We regress this on the occupation wage 
coefficients from the first stage, and report the results on this coefficient in Table 5.  A 
positive, significant coefficient indicates a greater feminization of higher wage occupations.  
If the increased representation of women in high-wage occupations was not pervasive, it 
would be difficult to detect in an analysis in which the unit of the observation is the 
occupation.  
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[Table 5 about here] 
We experiment with the following variants of this framework to ensure that the finding is 
robust.  Introducing a quartic in years of schooling to the first stage regression changes the 
definition of a “high-wage” occupation from one that pays well, to one that pays equally-
educated workers well.  Restricting the first stage sample to male or to female workers allows 
for the possibility that the occupations that pay women well are not those that pay men well.  
Weighting by occupations’ employment shares in 1981 and 2005 ensures that the result is 
observed in occupations that were larger in the initial year and larger in the final year.  Rows 
1-5 of Table 5 indicate that the feminization of higher wage occupations was a pervasive 
phenomenon, broadly robust to these combinations.  
To ensure that women’s movement into high-wage occupations was both pervasive and 
observed within education classes, rows 6-8 of Table 5 present the regression results when 
the first and second stage samples are limited to workers with exactly high-school, college 
and post-graduate degrees.  We find that the best jobs feminized even amongst groups of 
workers with the same education level.   
[Figure 4 about here] 
Finally, we ask counterfactually, how much occupational upgrading men and women 
(separately) should have experienced based only upon changes in their education levels. To 
simulate these counterfactuals we assume that the distribution of occupations within 
education groups for men and women remained as they were in 1981, and project the 
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occupational employment shares predicted by for the observed increases in male and female 
educational attainment between 1981 and 2005.10  Figure 4 depicts these counterfactual 
distributions alongside the actual cumulative occupation distributions observed in 1981 and 
2005 (the same ones as appeared in Figure 1). 
The counterfactual results show that a large portion of female occupational upgrading is 
not attributable to educational upgrading. The actual cumulative distributions shifted 
downwards for women at all levels of the occupational ranking.  The proportion of this 
vertical shift that is not attributable to educational upgrading is 25% for the occupation 
ranked 100th from the bottom, 45% for the occupation ranked 150th from the bottom, and 65% 
for the 200th ranked occupation.  Thus, the share of female occupational upgrading that 
cannot be attributed to educational upgrading is substantial, and is larger for higher paying 
occupations.  For men, on the other hand, educational upgrading should have resulted in 
modest occupational upgrading, but none is observed.  
These results indicate that women’s more rapid occupational upgrading is partly driven 
by forces other than their growing educational advantage. We previously demonstrated that 
gender differences in occupational upgrading can account for much of the female college 
                                                 
10 Figure 4 is calculated from the wage sample. We define five education classes by years of 
schooling: <12, 12, 13-15, 16-17, >17 years.  To calculate the 2005 counterfactual share of 
employment in each occupation, we multiply the employment share of that occupation within each 
education class in 1981 by the change in the share of all employees belonging to that education class.  
We do this separately for men and women.  Occupational rank is determined by the wage rank of an 
occupation calculated from the pooled (male and female) sample. 
  
 
 
 
 
27 
boom. Together, these results are consistent with a causal connection from rising fale 
representation in higher paying occupations to the female college boom. 
 
WHICH SECTORS DROVE THE FEMALE COLLEGE BOOM? 
Trends 
Sector contributions to absorbing the net influx of workers in some group  are 
defined in identity (1). A sector’s total contribution to the college premium, , is defined in 
identity (2).  Time differencing (2), the sector’s contribution to the shift in the premium is 
simply the increase in this static contribution. 
(5a)  
This tells us how much each sector has contributed to the rise in the college premium by 
creating more and better opportunities for college graduates.  Intuitively, the sectors that have 
played this role are the proximate sources of rising skill demand – they offer the jobs that 
make it possible for the typical worker to realize a return on their investment in college.   
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 presents the contributions of 7 industries to absorbing the net influx of male and 
female college graduates and to the increase in their college premiums.  The combined 
( )sθ
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services sector absorbed between 86% and 150% of the net influx of college graduates in 
each demographic group, and this figure is always higher amongst men than women and 
among younger than older workers.11 Services also contributed more to the rising premium 
for men and younger workers.  These trends reflect the progressive reduction of employment 
in the male-dominated agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  This hit young men especially 
hard, releasing young male college graduates to seek employment in the services sector (note 
the large negative contribution of the manufacturing industry to absorbing young male 
college graduates).   
[Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 provides the analogous contributions of 17 occupations. Managerial and 
professional occupations stand out for being particularly supportive of the college boom. 
Professional occupations absorbed most of the net influx of young college graduates, and 
also account for most of the shift in the premium amongst the young. Managers, officials and 
proprietors also made large contributions to absorbing and rewarding college graduates. As 
might be expected, however, this occupation group generally absorbed more of the college 
influx in the more experienced and male groups. Also, consistent with the weakening of glass 
ceilings, the gender difference in the absorption of college graduates into management is 
smallest in the youngest experience group. 
                                                 
11 A sector’s contribution can exceed 100% if another sector’s contribution is negative. 
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The importance of service industries and of managerial and professional occupations is 
easy to reconcile.  Services industries employed 78-93% of managers and professionals in 
each of our four demographic groups in 2005 (table not shown). 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 examines gendered occupational changes in further detail.  It reveals clearly why 
these changes should have encouraged women rather than men to attend college.  The first 
four columns depict each occupation’s contribution per job to the college premium in 1981.  
The professional and managerial occupations (with the exception of food & fun 
professionals), typically offered contributions per job that were much larger than the actual 
college premium.  The next six columns of this table show the occupational distribution of 
male and female workers in 1981 and 2005.  The employment shares of professional and 
managerial occupations, increased respectively by 10 and 4 percentage points amongst 
women.  This is in contrast to only 3 and 2 percentage point increases amongst men.  
Because women have shifted into these high-contribution occupations rapidly, and men have 
not, women have reaped the reward that college education offers through these occupations, 
and between-occupation shifts account for most of the rise in female premium, and less of the 
rise in the male premium. 
The remaining columns of Table 8 show, for each occupation, the ratio of its employment 
share amongst women to its employment share amongst men.  This ratio is analogous to the 
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revealed comparative advantage index (RCA) in the literature on international trade (Balassa, 
1965).  It is greater than one when women are specialized in the occupation relative to men, 
and vice versa.  We will not speculate on the relative importance of the many possible 
sources of revealed comparative advantages.12   
The RCAs indicate that the occupations that contributed most to absorbing and rewarding 
college graduates (professionals, excluding food and fun, and managers) feminized rapidly.  
This highlights the importance of gendered employment shifts for the female college boom.  
Moreover, these are not simply shifts towards equal gender representation within 
occupations.  If they were, the RCAs would converge towards 1.  Some large traditionally 
masculine occupations became more masculine (craftsmen, operatives, farm laborers, and 
laborers) and two traditionally feminine occupations feminized further (teachers and other 
medical occupations).  
Finally, tables 6-8 also reveal large gender differences in the contributions of particular 
service subsectors to absorbing and rewarding college graduates. To avoid overwhelming the 
reader, we relegate the discussion of this evidence to the appendix.  There are two key 
findings. First, finance and business services have been more important for men, while 
medicine and professional services have been much more important for women.  Second, one 
                                                 
12 For example, they could reflect differences in relative labor productivity across occupations 
(Pitt et al., 2012); preferences for some types of work or work environments over others, gender 
differences in the importance of scheduling flexibility; risk preferences (DeLeire and Levy, 2004) or 
gender essentialist beliefs (Charles and Grusky, 2005). 
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single profession – teaching, can account completely for the fact that older women’s college 
premiums rose almost 9 percentage points more slowly than older men’s premiums; and for 
the fact that this gender difference is not observed amongst younger workers.  This is because 
amongst women the college premium within the teaching professions is large, and the 
profession’s employment share amongst older college-educated women halved.  
The role of institutionally protected jobs. 
There are many possible reasons for gender specialization in occupations and industries.  
Two such reasons have been linked to the female college boom: gender preferences of 
workers or employers (including discrimination); and the varying levels of flexibility offered 
by occupations and industries in terms of part-time work and time out of the labor force, 
which accommodate home production and mitigate risks associated with divorce (Bronson, 
2013; Charles and Grusky, 2005).   
Together, the growing importance of professional upgrading and post-graduate education 
for women hint at a further possible explanation for the female college boom.   Some jobs 
offer wages that are protected against fluctuations and downwards trends, either because the 
wages are institutionally determined (e.g. public employees), or because the limited supply of 
credentials constrains the number of new entrants that are likely (e.g. lawyers).  These 
protections may be more important for women, given that women are more likely to be single 
parents, and appear to be more risk averse  (Bertrand, 2011).  There is already evidence that 
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risk preferences influence occupation choice (Bonin et al., 2007), and that women tend to 
sort into occupations that involve less risk of death (DeLeire and Levy, 2004).  Charles and 
Luoh (2003) suggest that the female college boom occurs partly because college reduces the 
variance of future incomes more for women than for men – a claim that is consistent with our 
institutionally protected jobs hypothesis.  Several commentators have pointed to problems of 
weakening overall labor demand due to mechanization, computerization and trade 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; Spence and Hlatshwayo, 2011), which would deepen the 
incentives for women to use college to reduce risks in this way. 
[Table 9 about here] 
To examine this hypothesis, we settle on a set of jobs (defined empirically by a worker’s 
industry, occupation, unionization and public employment status) that are likely to pay 
institutionally determined wages, or require credentials whose supply is institutionally 
restricted.  Our hypothesis suggests that more of the influx of female than male college 
graduates should have found work in these sectors, and also that the institutionally protected 
jobs would have contributed more to lifting the female college premium than to lifting the 
male college premium.  Table 9 confirms both suggestions. Institutionally protected jobs 
released male college graduates (the combined contribution of these jobs to absorbing male 
college graduates is negative), who found employment in institutionally unprotected sectors.  
Meanwhile, institutionally protected jobs absorbed roughly a quarter of the much larger net 
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influx of female college graduates.  The institutionally protected jobs also contributed twice 
as much to lifting the college premiums for low- and medium experience women as for their 
male counterparts.  Finally, their contribution to lifting the premium increases as we shift 
attention to lower experience groups, suggesting the growing importance of institutionally 
protected jobs to the college boom. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have asked whether and which types of employment shifts across industries and 
occupations could help to explain why the US college boom has been dominated by women.  
We found that the feminization of good jobs could plausibly have played this role, but that 
structural employment trends did not favor a female college boom. We have also provided 
evidence ruling out the possibility that women’s higher rate of occupational upgrading was 
driven solely by their growing educational advantage over men.  Finally, we have shown that 
men and women have capitalized on their college educations in different ways in the labor 
market, with men relying more on financial activities, and women relying more on jobs in 
institutionally protected services, particularly in health and education.   
These findings could have policy implications.  If demand for college comes increasingly 
from women, and if women are increasingly using college to access institutionally protected 
jobs, then growth in the demand for college education becomes increasingly intertwined with 
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the growth of such jobs. Rapid growth in institutionally protected jobs seems unlikely, both 
because of the nature of the protections themselves – credentialing and collective bargaining 
often restrain job creation in the process of stabilizing wages, and because many of them rely 
on stretched public budgets. This raises the possibility that demand for college-graduates 
might grow more slowly in future – a worrying prospect in the presence of rapidly growing 
student debt.   
On the other hand, this cautionary note is countered by trends in the college premium 
itself, and in student interest in attending college, both of which have continued to grow in 
recent years.  Our results imply that employment shifts can explain some, but certainly not all 
of this increase in the relative demand for college-educated workers. Technological change 
within sectors likely explains much of the rest, and technology may continue to boost 
demand for college graduates. At the same time, more of the increase in the college premium 
arises due to declining real earnings of high-school graduates than because of rising real 
earnings of college graduates, and it is possible that as technology advances, it will begin to 
substitute for both high-school and college graduates.  In the face of this ambiguity on the 
demand side of the labor market, it will be helpful for economic analyses to keep track of 
what college graduates of different types do for a living, how much they are paid for doing it, 
and how those wages are set. 
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APPENDIX: A DETAILED LOOK AT SOME KEY SECTORS. 
Tables 6-8 capture developments in three sub-sectors. The Finance, Insurance and 
Business Services sustained male college attendance. Together, expansion and educational 
upgrading in these industries absorbed 67% of the net influx of male college graduates 
amongst the young (Table 6), and 105% (not shown) amongst medium experience workers.  
In contrast, they absorbed no more than 21% of the female influx, regardless of experience 
group.  These industries also contributed 34% of the increase in the young male premium, 
and only 19% of the young female premium (Table 6).  Additionally, professionals in the 
finance industry also became more masculine (table not shown for brevity). 
The medical industry has been far more felicitous of female college graduates.  It 
absorbed 11-19% of the influx of female college graduates (depending on the experience 
group), but between negative 12% and positive 7% of the net influx of male graduates (Table 
6).  It accounts for 7% and 18% of the rise in the college premium for younger and older 
women respectively, but less than 1% of its rise for younger and older men (Table 6).  
Similarly, our two explicitly medical occupations (Physicians and Other Medical) in 
combination made robust positive contributions to absorbing the influx and shifting the 
college premiums of low and high experience women, but made negative contributions on 
both accounts for men (Table 7).  Moreover, both these occupations are feminizing, even 
though the Other Medical Professions category was already overwhelmingly feminine (Table 
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8).  In contrast with these professional medical occupations, which deliver the medical 
services, managerial occupations within medicine, which handle the business end of 
healthcare, contributed positively to the shift in male college premium (table not shown, for 
brevity).  
Jobs in the education sector have been pivotal in accounting for trends in college 
premiums, especially amongst older women.  Amongst high experience workers, the 
education industry absorbed 8% of the net influx of female college graduates but negative 
20% of the male influx (Table 6). It also accounts for around 19% of the rise in the college 
premium for young men and women (Table 6).  As we have noted earlier, the college 
premium rose 32.7 percentage points for older men and only 24.3 points for older women.  
Roughly this entire difference can be attributed to the gender differential in the contributions 
to older workers’ college premiums of either the teaching profession13 (Table 7) or the 
education industry (Table 6).  This gender differential arises because college premiums 
within the teaching profession are much higher than those in other occupations for women, 
but not for men; and because the share of older female college graduates working as teachers 
roughly halved between 1981 and 2005.  This sharply reduced the college premium for older 
women.  The teaching profession accounted for a much smaller share of employment 
amongst young workers and older men throughout our sample period, and their college 
                                                 
13 Arithmetically by .6 percentage points (=0.017*32.7), and lowered the female premium by 8.3 
points, a difference which is 98% of the 8.4 (=32.7-24.3) point differential to be explained. 
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premiums have trended similarly.  Thus, a declining reliance by women on one profession – 
teaching – may have eliminated gender differences in trends in the college premium between 
cohorts. 
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Table 1: College attainment and college premiums
1981 2005 Change 1981 2005 Change 1981 2005 Change
Men 23.21 26.51 3.30 5.92 6.23 0.31 36.41 63.02 26.62
Women 23.26 35.92 12.66 4.62 9.41 4.79 42.80 68.55 25.74
Men 28.58 31.70 3.12 10.72 10.42 -0.30 39.01 73.55 34.54
Women 21.89 39.01 17.12 6.53 13.64 7.11 43.55 69.91 26.37
Men 23.88 31.77 7.89 10.71 10.50 -0.21 39.48 72.16 32.68
Women 16.07 34.59 18.53 4.59 10.78 6.19 44.17 68.44 24.27
College Premium (%)
Note: College attainment is the percentage of the count sample that holds a college degree or higher. Post-college attainment 
is the share holding a post-graduate qualification or with 6 or more years of tertiary education.  The college premium is 
calculated from the wage sample, as the difference in log-weekly-wages between workers with at least a college degree on 
those holding only a high-school diploma or equivalent.
High
Medium
Low
College Attainment (%)Experience 
Group Sex
Post-College Attainment (%)
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Classification Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
3 Industries 2.1 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.6 0.7 1.7 1
10 Industries 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.9 2.3 1.8 2.8 1.8
17 Industries 1.5 2.7 0.5 2.5 2.9 2.1 3.6 2.2
66 Industries 2 3.3 0.5 2.9 3.2 2.5 3.5 2.2
3 Occupations 3.2 6.3 0.6 5.9 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.9
10 Occupations 3.4 6.5 0.1 6 5 4.6 4.9 3.6
17 Occupations 2.9 7 -0.3 5.6 4.9 4.5 4.8 3.4
10 Occupations, 17 I 2.7 6.9 -0.2 5.9 5.2 4.8 5.7 4.1
Shift to be explained 3.3 12.7 7.9 18.5 3.3 12.7 7.9 18.5
Note: Calculations use the count sample and the definition of between-sector absorption presented in identity (1) 
and the text. The shifts in attainment to be explained are defined and presented in Table 1.
Table 2: Between Sector Absorption of the Net Influx of College Graduates
Gender-specific Emp. Shifts Pooled Emp. Shifts
Low Experience High Experience Low Experience High Experience
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
3 Industries 4.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 3.4 1.6 3.0 2.8
10 Industries 3.7 4.5 2.1 6.0 2.9 3.3 4.5 6.6
17 Industries 2.6 5.3 3.8 4.4 3.5 3.5 5.8 5.0
66 Industries 5.4 6.3 3.2 5.0 3.6 4.0 3.4 7.2
3 Occupations 7.9 16.6 -0.9 14.4 6.6 6.8 6.7 7.8
10 Occupations 10.5 20.1 0.0 16.6 9.6 8.8 8.8 10.3
17 Occupations 8.3 20.6 0.2 17.1 8.3 8.6 7.0 9.8
10 Occupations, 17 Industries 10.1 21.6 5.0 17.0 9.6 9.9 11.4 13.1
Shift to be explained: 26.6 25.7 32.7 24.3 26.6 25.7 32.7 24.3
Table 3: Between-sector contributions to the shift in the college premium
Note: All results from wage sample.  Between shifts defined in identity (3) and the text.  College premiums defined 
in Table 1 and the text.
Classification
Demographic-Specific Employment Shifts Population Level Employment Shifts
Low Experience High Experience Low Experience High Experience
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Table 4: Supply and Demand Analysis
Industries Ind. & Occ.
(1) High-school -8.5 -26.5 -8.2
(2) College 2.4 6.4 4.2
(3) Relative (College: High School 10.9 32.8 12.3
(4) High-school -1.7 13.1 1.2
(5) College 7.8 16.9 6.0
(6) Relative (College: High School 9.5 3.8 4.8
(7) High-school -10.2 -11.4 -4.6
(8) College 10.2 10.4 4.9
(9) Relative (College: High School 20.3 21.8 9.5
%∆ Supply
%∆ Demand Between:
Men
Women
Overall
Note: Supply and demand shifts for each cell are measured relative to the labor force.  
Quantities are measured in efficiency units. Calculations are explained in detail in section 4c. 
Between-shifts are calculated using the Katz and Murphy (1992) demand shift index.  
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Years of 
schooling
Gender 
dummy
Employment shares 
in 1981
Employment 
shares in 2005 No weights
0.192 0.187 0.157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.187 0.189 0.158
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
0.217 0.204 0.114
(0.000) (0.000) (0.082)
0.188 0.174 0.103
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019)
0.197 0.196 0.132
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
0.182 0.130 0.148
(0.000) (0.020) (0.021)
0.221 0.206 0.154
(0.000) (0.000) (0.093)
0.140 0.099 0.108
(0.001) (0.042) (0.121)
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. P-values in parentheses. See Section 4 for details. 
Women
High school grads, 
both genders
College grads, 
both genders
Post-graduates, 
both genders
First stage sample
Both genders
Both genders
Both genders
Men
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Table 5: Feminization of high-wage occupations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
High-school 
grads
No Yes
Post-
graduates
No Yes
College 
grads
All workers
All workers
Second 
stage 
sample
First stage regression Controls
All workers
All workers
All workers
Coefficients, when second stage is weighted by
No No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No Yes
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Table 6: Contributions of industries to absorbing college graduates and shifting the college premium
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Ag & Mining -28.4 -0.3 -1.9 1.4 -6.3 0.1 -2.1 1.0
Construction 5.8 1.3 11.6 2.1 -2.0 0.5 2.4 0.2
Manufacturing -27.5 3.5 1.0 10.7 4.8 10.1 17.4 25.1
Services, of which: 150.2 95.5 89.3 85.8 103.5 89.4 82.3 73.8
Finance & Bus. Serv. 67.1 20.1 40.5 19.5 33.7 18.7 35.2 23.9
Education 35.2 21.3 -19.9 7.8 18.7 19.0 1.7 -31.7
Medical -11.6 10.9 7.7 18.6 1.0 7.0 0.6 18.1
Services (other) 59.5 43.1 61.0 39.8 50.1 44.7 44.8 63.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net influx or shift in college premium to be explained: 3.3 12.7 7.9 18.5 26.6 25.7 32.7 24.3
Industry
Note: Contributions to absorption calculated from the count sample and defined in identity (1).  Contributions to shifting the premium calculated 
from the wage sample and defined in identities (2) and (5a).
Contribution to absorbing the net influx of 
college graduates (percentage points)
Contribution to shifting the college 
premium (percentage points)
Low High Low High
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Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
63.1 63.9 3.4 47.4 61.4 63.9 34.4 22.8
Prof. Tech. (other) 114.2 29.6 30.1 19.1 46.3 23.9 25.8 24.7
Prof. Physicians -10.2 2.5 -2.8 2.4 -1.1 2.7 -1.4 4.6
Prof. Other Medical -4.7 5.9 2.3 12.4 1.1 6.3 0.8 13.5
Prof. Teachers (Not 17.4 12.1 -13.2 2.5 9.2 15.8 1.5 -37
Prof. Legal -20.7 2.7 0.3 2 -2.5 3.4 4.7 6.8
Prof. Finance (Accou -7.1 6.4 0.3 5.7 0.9 8.9 3.3 7.6
Prof. STEM -25.3 4.4 -14.1 4.2 1.1 3.1 -1.3 6.2
Prof. Food & Fun -0.5 0.3 0.5 -0.9 6.4 -0.4 1 -3.7
-6.7 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.5 0 0 0.1
25.1 19.8 45.5 22.4 15.1 20.6 39.9 47.7
23.9 7.1 13.2 12.5 6.6 11.3 4.1 4.5
-6.7 8.4 3.6 8.1 11 6.6 8 13.1
-9.3 -1.8 12.5 1.3 0.2 -0.5 2.4 2.5
-7.2 -0.4 8.7 0.3 0 -2.7 0.3 -2.6
19.8 4.2 9.4 7.3 12.1 0.8 5.5 13.6
-1.4 -0.1 -0.1 0 -2.5 -0.2 0.3 -0.5
-0.7 -0.7 4.2 0.5 -3.2 0.4 5 -1.1
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
3.3 12.7 7.9 18.5 26.6 25.7 32.7 24.3Net influx or shift in college prem    
Note: Contributions to absorption calculated from the count sample and defined in identity (1).  Contributions to shifting the 
premium calculated from the wage sample and defined in identities (2) and (5a).
Craftsmen
Operatives
Service Workers
Farm Laborers
Laborers
Total
Occupation
Professionals, of wh
Farmers
Managers, Officials, a  
Clerical and Kindred
Sales Workers
Table 7: Contributions of occupations to absorbing college graduates and shifting the college premium
Contribution to absorbing the net influx of 
college graduates (%)
Contribution to shifting the college 
premium (%)
Low High Low High
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Table 8: Occupations' contributions per job to the college premium, and their employment shares amongst men and women
Men Women Men Women 1981 2005 1981 2005 1981 2005 Change
Professionals, of which: 16.51 19.17 18.24 28.24 1.11 1.47 0.37
Prof. Tech. (other) 71.3 104.8 51.4 109.1 4.46 8.24 4.05 8.82 0.91 1.07 0.16
Prof. Physicians 133.4 279.8 353.0 432.3 0.93 0.97 0.18 0.48 0.19 0.50 0.30
Prof. Other Medical 88.8 120.9 55.7 110.7 1.09 1.37 4.65 6.55 4.26 4.79 0.53
Prof. Teachers (Not Professors) 30.8 94.5 36.1 176.1 1.86 2.05 4.97 7.26 2.67 3.54 0.88
Prof. Legal 176.5 254.5 194.4 297.6 0.94 0.84 0.19 0.49 0.20 0.58 0.38
Prof. Finance (Accountants) 134.6 88.7 121.6 38.6 1.33 0.92 1.11 1.81 0.84 1.96 1.13
Prof. STEM 114.5 122.4 93.8 94.3 4.79 3.66 1.18 1.38 0.25 0.38 0.13
Prof. Food & Fun -36.5 62.9 6.9 93.6 1.11 1.12 1.92 1.44 1.73 1.29 -0.44
Farmers 79.5 0.0 7.9 59.9 1.97 0.86 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.32 0.16
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors 83.5 78.5 69.3 22.9 13.27 15.54 6.51 10.82 0.49 0.70 0.21
Clerical and Kindred 21.3 5.8 28.6 1.6 5.96 7.46 33.67 27.93 5.65 3.74 -1.91
Sales Workers 71.4 50.7 44.7 29.1 6.36 6.20 7.25 6.41 1.14 1.03 -0.11
Craftsmen -5.8 16.2 -9.0 -23.7 20.57 18.23 1.85 1.32 0.09 0.07 -0.02
Operatives -1.1 4.5 7.1 12.7 17.03 13.87 10.97 5.20 0.64 0.37 -0.27
Service Workers 33.4 47.7 29.3 33.6 9.24 11.12 19.25 18.76 2.08 1.69 -0.40
Farm Laborers 73.1 55.1 52.0 85.0 1.65 0.72 0.69 0.21 0.42 0.29 -0.12
Laborers 23.3 16.3 19.7 34.8 7.43 6.83 1.26 0.85 0.17 0.12 -0.05
36.4 42.8 39.5 44.2 100 100 100 100
Contribution per job to the 
college premium in 1981
Low High
Note: The distributions are calculated for the entire count sample and represent the share of men and women in the workforce in 
each occupation.  The revealed comparative advantage is calculated by taking ratio of women's and men's employment for each 
occupation.
Occupation
Aggregate
Men's 
Occupational 
Distribution
Women's 
Occupational 
Distribution
Revealed 
Comparative 
Advantage
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Table 9: Contributions of institutionally protected sectors to absorbing college graduates and shifting the college premium
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Institutionally Protected Sectors, including: -25.1 25.7 -20.6 29.2 14.8 30.7 -1.1 -0.8
Dentists -3.5 1.0 -2.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 -2.0 0.4
Dieticians and nutritionists 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.0
Funeral directors and embalmers -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.1
Lawyers and judges -21.0 3.0 1.9 1.1 -3.4 3.7 5.8 4.1
Nurses, professional -0.2 3.2 -0.3 7.7 0.2 4.7 0.9 13.3
Optometrists 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pharmacists -3.5 0.7 -1.0 0.5 -0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9
Physicians and surgeons -3.1 1.1 -1.0 2.2 -0.6 0.8 0.1 6.8
Teachers (n.e.c.) 40.1 31.9 11.3 20.3 9.9 30.4 4.4 29.5
Veterinarians -2.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1
Electricians -1.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 -0.4 1.2 0.0
Other Public Employment -44.0 -23.5 -36.7 -8.5 4.1 -19.5 -13.7 -61.4
Other, non-public, unionized jobs 14.2 8.1 7.0 4.8 3.1 9.5 1.2 4.7
Unprotected sectors 125.1 74.3 120.6 70.8 85.2 69.3 101.1 100.8
Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net influx or shift in college premium to be explaine 3.3 12.7 7.9 18.5 26.6 25.7 32.7 24.3
Occupation
Note: Contributions to absorption calculated from the count sample and defined in identity (1).  Contributions to shifting the premium 
calculated from the wage sample and defined in identities (2) and (5a).
Share of the net influx of college Share of the shift in the college 
Low High Low High
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Note: Solid lines depict the distribution in 1981, dashed lines indicate 2005.  Occupations are ranked by wage calculated from the pooled (male and 
female) wage sample.  Occupations are ranked from lowest wage (0) to highest wage (254).
Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Occupational Employment by Sex
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Note: Average wages were estimated using the wage sample across all employees in each occupation
         in 1981.
Figure 2: The Feminization of High Wage Occupations
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Note: Solid lines depict the distribution in 1981, dashed lines indicate 2005.
Occupations are ranked by wage within each education class for the pooled
sample of men and women in that education class. Occupations are ranked
from lowest wage (0) to highest wage(254).
Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of Occupational
Employment by Sex and Education Class
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Note: Solid lines depict the distribution in 1981, dashed lines indicated 2005.  Short dashed lines depict the the 2005 counterfactual distribution.  Occupations are
           ranked by wage calculated from the pooled (male and female) wage sample.  Occupations are ranked from lowest wage (0) to highest wage (254).
Figure 4: Counterfactual Distributions of Occupational Employment by Sex
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Abstract 
I estimate the intergenerational transmission of education in the United States between 1980 
and 2013.  I find that intergenerational persistence in education has increased substantially 
among blacks in recent years while remaining stable among whites and Hispanics.  I observe this 
trend when using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics as well as the National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Youth.  I demonstrate that much of the increase in educational 
persistence among blacks is due to decreases in upward mobility.  The increase in black 
educational persistence is found in both two-parent and single-parent households, and I do not 
find similar trends and differences when estimating intergenerational income persistence. 
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I. Introduction 
There is limited information on recent trends of the intergenerational transmission of 
education in the United States.  While racial differences in income persistence have recently been 
studied (e.g. Bhattacharya and Mazumder, 2011), racial differences in educational persistence 
have received comparably less attention.14  In this paper I present recent estimates of 
intergenerational persistence in education in the United States between 1980 and 2013 and 
analyze racial differences in educational persistence, highlighting a dramatic increase in 
educational persistence among blacks in recent decades. 
Studying the intergenerational transmission of education is useful because education is 
positively correlated with many outcomes that contribute to socioeconomic status and wellbeing.  
For decades, education has been viewed as an investment in human capital which increases an 
individual’s productivity and hourly wage (Park, 1994).  It is also well known that individuals 
with more education suffer less unemployment and work in more prestigious occupations (Card, 
1999).  In addition to the labor market benefits of education, increased education also reduces 
                                                 
14 The term intergenerational persistence is used less in the literature, but is useful to describe many 
findings in this paper.  Intergenerational persistence is the opposite of intergenerational mobility. 
  
 
 
 
 
56 
the probability of incarceration and arrest (Lochner and Moretti, 2004), and there is evidence 
that increases in education improve the health of individuals (Kemptner et al., 2011).  The 
educational attainment of an individual summarizes a great deal of information about his or her 
wellbeing, and many of these associations appear to be causal. 
There are also advantages to using education over income as a metric of the 
intergenerational transmission of economic advantage.  Firstly, one’s educational attainment 
does not usually change over a person’s adult lifetime or depend on his or her employment 
status.  This is especially important when measuring the socioeconomic status of women.  The 
labor force participation of women in the U.S. has increased greatly over time, and life events 
such as childbirth may impact a woman’s decision to participate in the labor market.  Women 
who don’t work, whether part of a long-term trend or by personal decision are unable to report 
their wage rates.  However, they are able to report their educational attainment.  Misreporting of 
educational attainment is also likely to be low in longitudinal surveys and can be substantially 
mitigated by using information from all years in which an individual was interviewed as an adult.  
This is possible because most individuals complete their lifetime education by their mid-twenties 
(Black and Devereux, 2011).15 
                                                 
15 There are many other benefits to using education over income.  Unlike income, there is no such 
thing as negative educational attainment, and the upper bound on education is has effectively remained at 
the PhD level for a long time.  The time-invariant bounds on educational attainment and the fact that 
years of schooling is a discrete measure of education provide natural cutoff points when constructing 
transition matrices.  Finally, while there are multiple ways to obtain a certain level of income such as 
increased time working, capital income, or gifts, the road to additional years of schooling is single-track: 
one must have a high school diploma or equivalent before he or she can earn a college degree.  Thus 
studies of the intergenerational transmission of education will likely provide clear information for policy. 
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My measure of educational persistence is the estimated coefficient of children’s years of 
schooling on their parents’ years of schooling.  I call the estimated regression coefficient on 
parents’ education the intergenerational transmission of education (ITE).16  There have been 
numerous studies of educational persistence in the United States using the regression of parents’ 
years of schooling on children’s years of schooling (Altonji and Dunn, 1996; Couch and Dunn; 
1997; Chevalier, 2003; Hertz et al., 2007; Huang, 2013).  These studies estimate the coefficient 
on parent’s years of schooling to be between .15 and .54.  However, it is difficult to make 
comparisons between studies because researchers use different birth cohorts and estimate the 
ITE at different points in time.  Also, many researchers have utilized surveys that are not 
nationally representative of the United States in an effort to study the causes of educational 
persistence (Black et al, 2008; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Plug, 2004).  Nonetheless, 
estimates from these studies provide a context for this paper.  A summary of studies of 
educational persistence in the United States and their estimates is found in Table 1.  With the 
exception of Huang (2013), these studies do not discuss racial differences in educational 
persistence.17 
                                                 
16 It is also common to use the correlation between parents’ and children’s years of schooling to 
summarize educational persistence.  However, I do not discuss trends and racial differences in the 
correlation coefficient in the main portion of this paper because the findings from correlations are similar 
to the ones reached from the regression coefficients.  The correlation coefficients and a brief discussion 
are provided in Appendix D. 
 
17 One notable study not mentioned in Table 1 explicitly looks at white-black differences in income 
and educational mobility (Bloome and Western, 2011).  This study is not included in Table 1 because the 
authors do not use correlations or a linear regression to describe mobility. 
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I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to analyze long-term trends in 
educational persistence.  The PSID has been used in numerous studies of trends in income 
persistence (e.g. Mayer and Lopoo, 2005; Lee and Solon, 2009), but has not been utilized to 
study long-term trends in educational persistence.  The PSID’s main benefit is that it allows me 
to analyze educational persistence for many birth cohorts across many years.  Additionally, I 
utilize the recently released 2013 round of the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY97) and the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to analyze 
educational persistence for two recent birth cohorts.18  The main benefit of the NLSYs is that 
they have a large number of observations on narrow birth cohorts, which will be helpful for 
constructing transition matrices by race. 
I find that intergenerational persistence in education has remained unchanged in the general 
population in the last few decades.  However, I find that educational persistence has increased 
substantially in recent years among blacks.  To determine the nature of this increase in 
persistence, I use transition matrices and new directional measures of upward and downward 
mobility (Bhattacharya and Mazumder, 2011).  These new directional measures have been 
designed to make racial comparisons in income mobility, but have yet to be applied to make 
racial comparisons in educational mobility.  Using transition matrices and the directional 
measures of mobility, I find that upward mobility has declined for both whites and blacks, and 
that the declines in upward mobility are much larger among blacks.  I demonstrate that the 
increase in black educational persistence is prevalent among both two-parent and single-parent 
                                                 
18 The 2013 round of the NLSY97 was released on September 25th, 2015. 
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households.  Finally, I show that intergenerational persistence in income does not follow the 
same racial pattern: it has remained stable among both whites and blacks. 
II. Data 
As noted, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the 1979 and 1997 
National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79 and NLSY97) to analyze educational mobility.  The 
two datasets have different strengths and limitations.  The PSID is useful for estimating the ITE 
over a longer period time than the NLSYs.  The PSID has far fewer observations on young 
adults compared to the NLSYs.  Thus my estimates of the ITE when using the PSID are less 
precise than my estimates from the NLSYs.  Additionally, because the PSID did not make 
adjustments for immigration until recent years, the population it represents will be more 
misaligned with the actual population in the U.S.  On the other hand, the NLSYs are 
representative of the entire population of youth in 1979 and 1997, including immigrants.  
Moreover, there are many more observations per birth cohort in the NLSYs compared to the 
PSID.  This will be useful for constructing mobility transition matrices by race.   Though not the 
focus of this paper, the NLSYs also contain much information on recent immigrants and 
children of immigrants in the United States including Hispanics.   
Figure 1 displays the timeline for the NLSYs.  Data on mothers is collected in the base year 
of each survey.  I collect information on adult outcomes of respondents when they are 29-33 
years old in 1993 for the NLSY79 and 2013 for the NLSY97 and estimate educational 
persistence in these years.  The PSID follows a similar pattern, but I am able to estimate an 
intergenerational persistence coefficient for a five-year birth cohort centered on every survey year 
  
 
 
 
 
60 
between 1980 and 2013.  Thus, by using both datasets, I will be able to provide both a broad 
historical context of intergenerational persistence using the PSID, and also deeply analyze 
differences by race using the NLSYs. 
a. National Longitudinal Surveys 
I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) to estimate the ITE among respondents when 
they are 29-33 years old in 1993 or 2013.  Individuals in the NLSY79 are a nationally 
representative sample of youth aged 14-22 when first surveyed in 1979, and individuals in the 
NLSY97 are a nationally representative sample of youth aged 12-18 when first surveyed in 
1997.19   Individuals in the NLSY79 have been surveyed annually prior to 1994 and biannually 
after 1994.  Individuals in the NLSY97 have been surveyed annually with 2013 being the latest 
public release. 
There are many benefits of using the NLSYs to estimate the ITE.  Firstly, the surveys are 
nationally representative of all youth in the United States, including youth living in juvenile 
detention centers or other institutions and youth who are immigrants or born from immigrants.  
Secondly, the NLSYs have a large number of respondents which will allow me to precisely 
estimate the ITE and construct detailed transition matrices.20  Finally, the NLSY97 was designed 
in part in order to facilitate cross-cohort research with the NLSY79, and as such, many variables 
                                                 
19 It is often stated that the NLSY97 is a nationally representative survey of youth who were 12-16 
years old as of December 31, 1996. When describing the age of individuals in the NLSY97 at the time of 
the first interview in 1997, reported ages cover a bit broader range of 12-18 years. 
20 See Appendix C for full 21x21 transition matrices by race and survey. 
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common to both surveys are recorded using identical schemes as documented by Altonji, 
Bharadwaj, and Lange (2008).  Pooling both surveys will allow me to statistically detect any 
change in the ITE. 
Because people tend to complete their lifetime education by their mid-twenties (Black and 
Devereux, 2011), the NLSY97 is now a practical survey for estimating the ITE.  I use 
respondents in the NLSY79 born in 1960-64 to analyze mobility in 1993, when they are 29-33 
years old.21  Similarly, I use respondents in the NLSY97 born in 1980-84 to analyze mobility in 
2013, when they are 29-33 years old.  Figure 1 depicts the timeline of respondents in the 
NLSY79 and NLSY97 for this study.  Attrition is prevalent in both surveys. Of the original 
NLSY79 respondents, 78.9% participated in the 1993 round.  Of the original NLSY97 
respondents, 78.5% participated in the 2013 round.22 
Variables I use include years of schooling of the respondent and respondent’s mother, sex of 
the respondent, age of the respondent, and the race of the respondent.  Unfortunately, the 
NLSY79 has far less detail on race than the NLSY97.  To keep race definitions consistent 
between the two surveys I use three broad races: white, black, and Hispanic.  A NLS97 
respondent who chooses “American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut”, “Asian or Pacific Islander”, or 
“Something else?” as his or her race is taken to be part of the white population.23   The main 
                                                 
21 Because of the wider age range of respondents in the NLSY79, NLSY79 respondents are 29-37 
years old in 1993.  I exclude individuals who are aged 34-37 to match the age bracket of individuals in the 
2013 round of the NLSY97. 
22 I address attrition and other sources of missing data in Appendix B and provide evidence that 
missing data do not seriously alter the main findings of this paper. 
23 This level of detail is not available in the baseline survey of the NLSY79. 
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discussion in this paper is focused on differences among the black and white subpopulations in 
the U.S. over time.  However, I include results for Hispanics throughout for completeness.   
Years of schooling for respondents and their mothers is recorded as the highest grade 
completed starting from 1st grade to eight or more years of college.24  Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for both surveys. 25  Panels A and B describe the NLSY79 and NLSY97 
respectively by race and variables of interest.26  A few things are apparent.  Firstly, the average of 
mother’s years of schooling is higher among whites than among blacks.  Children’s average years 
of schooling is higher among whites than blacks in both surveys.  Children’s years of schooling 
has increased among whites and blacks, with whites experiencing a bigger increase. 
b. Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study long-term trends of the ITE 
from 1980 to 2013.  The PSID is a longitudinal household survey in the United States.  The first 
survey took place in 1968 with a sample of nearly 5,000 households living in the United States 
and re-interviewed these respondents and household members of these respondents in 
subsequent years.  The original survey was conducted by the Survey Research Center at the 
                                                 
24 Individuals who report more than four years of college either have spent the additional years 
pursuing college degrees or post-secondary education.  I do not distinguish between the two when 
presenting this paper’s main results.  The majority of respondents who report greater than four years of 
college have post-secondary degrees.  Appendix A shows plots data in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 pooled 
and separated by race.  Most of the data does not lie on the bounds of the years of schooling distribution. 
25 The average age of mothers appears to be higher in the NLSY79 than in NLSY97 when each 
survey was first conducted.  This is because NLSY97 respondents in 1997 are younger on average than 
NLSY79 respondents in 1979. 
26 The main discussion in this paper is focused on differences among the black and white 
subpopulations in the U.S. over time.  However, I include results for Hispanics throughout for 
completeness. 
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University of Michigan and includes a nationally representative sample of individuals and an 
oversample of individuals from low income households from the Survey of Economic 
Opportunity at the U.S. Census Bureau.  These samples will henceforth be referred to as the 
SRC and SEO samples.  I use survey weights from the PSID in all my analyses to adjust for 
sampling changes and attrition.  The combined SRC and SEO samples are intended to represent 
all individuals in the United States except for individuals who immigrated to the United States 
after 1968 and their descendants.27 
A major benefit of using the PSID is that the survey design enables me to estimate the ITE 
repeatedly over a long timeframe.  The PSID collects information on both parents and children 
living in a household and tracks the characteristics of these individuals over time, even when 
children leave the parental household.  Because of this, the PSID is often used to study 
intergenerational mobility in the United States (e.g. Mazumder, 2005; Lee and Solon, 2009). 
Variables in the PSID that I use include years of schooling of the respondent and 
respondent’s mother, the race of the household head, sex of the respondent and the age of the 
respondent.  Years of schooling is recorded as 0-17 years of schooling.28  I estimate the ITE 
among individuals who are 29-33 years old in any survey year.  I do this in part to match the age 
bracket of respondents in the NLSYs used to estimate the ITE.  Secondly, by choosing a narrow 
age bracket, the respondents used to estimate the ITE is fully replaced every five years.  If there 
                                                 
27 While the PSID has included an Immigrant sample since 1997, the children in this sample are not 
yet old enough to be included in my analysis. 
28 Individuals who have pursued some post-graduate work are recorded as having 17 years of 
schooling.  I do not make any adjustments to the years of schooling for these individuals.  Excluding 
these individuals does not substantially alter the main findings of this paper. 
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are any changes in the ITE over time by birth cohort, these changes would be realized with a 
narrow age bracket.  The first year I estimate the ITE is in 1980 for individuals aged 29-33 born 
in 1947-1951.  The last year I estimate the ITE is in 2013 for individuals aged 29-33, born in 
1982-1986. 
Unlike the NLSYs, I observe mother’s education across many survey years, even if the 
individual and his or her mother are no longer living together.  This is due to the design of the 
PSID, which surveys individuals who were a part of one of the original 1968 households, even if 
they are no longer living in that household.  To mitigate misreporting of mother’s years of 
schooling, I measure mother’s education as the mode of years of schooling reported in surveys 
when aged 25 or older.29   
I present descriptive statistics of the PSID in Table 3.  In any given year, white mothers and 
respondents have a higher mean years of schooling than black mothers and respondents.  These 
levels are similar to mean education levels from the US Census and American Community 
Survey.  The mean years of schooling has increased for respondents and mothers with black 
mothers experiencing the biggest increase between 1980 and 2013. 
The PSID has two major limitations.  Firstly, the sample of individuals in any year aged 29-
33 is much smaller when compared to other surveys such as the NLSYs.  Thus my estimates of 
the ITE when using the PSID are less precise than when using the NLSYs.  Secondly, Hispanic 
                                                 
29 I use mother’s rather than father’s years of schooling to maximize the number of observations.  
The results of this paper do not change substantially when using father’s years of schooling, an average of 
the parents, or the maximum years of schooling between the parents.  Smith (2008) demonstrates that it 
is analytically ambiguous whether the average of parental education reduces measurement error. 
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and Asian immigration has been a substantial source of demographic change in the United States 
following the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  While the PSID was nationally 
representative of households in 1968, it has become misaligned with the United States 
population over time due to immigration.  Though the Immigrant sample was added to address 
this issue, children in the immigrant sample are not yet old enough to be included in my 
estimates.  Thus my estimates are representative of all individuals in the United States except for 
individuals who immigrated to the United States after 1968 and any of their descendants. 
III. Empirical Findings 
a. Regressions 
I estimate the ITE every PSID survey year from 1980-2013 by taking the sample of 
individuals aged 29-33 and using the following specification: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (1). 
The dependent variable is the respondent’s years of schooling when aged 29-33.  The 
independent variables are a constant term, and the years of schooling of the respondent’s 
mother (𝑀𝑌𝑖).  The coefficient on mother’s years of schooling (𝛽1) is the ITE for a particular 
survey year.  Because I use a five-year birth cohort aged 29-33 to estimate the ITE in any year, 
there will be significant overlap in the sample of individuals used to estimate the ITE when 
moving to the next year.  For example, PSID respondents who were born in 1947-1951 are used 
to estimate the ITE in 1980.  For the 1981 estimates, I use PSID respondents who were born in 
1948-1952.  Thus there is significant overlap of individuals used to produce ITE estimates for 
adjacent years in 1980-2013.  However, birth cohorts will be fully replaced every five years. 
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The ITE estimates for the PSID are presented in in Figures 2A-2C.  Figure 1A shows the 
estimated coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals.  For reference, the diamonds are the 
point estimates of the ITE from the NLSYs that I will describe below.  In Figure 2A, the ITE 
appears to have remained stable over the past few decades and is reasonable in magnitude. 
Figures 2B and 2C show estimates of the ITE separately for whites and blacks.  The ITE 
also appears to remain stable over time among whites.  However, among blacks, there has been a 
dramatic increase in educational persistence in recent years, particularly between 2001 and 
2007.30  In fact, when pooling estimated coefficients from 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 and 
testing for any difference between estimates pooled from 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999, I find the 
difference in estimated coefficients among blacks is significant at the 99% level.31  When I repeat 
this exercise for whites, I find no statistical difference.  While there appears to have been an 
increase in the ITE among blacks, it may only be temporary: the ITE among blacks has trended 
downwards in recent years. 
Corroborative evidence of a significant increase in the ITE among blacks comes from the 
NLSYs.  I pool both samples and estimate the ITE using the following specification: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑌𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀       (2). 
                                                 
30 Note that black mothers of children in earlier birth cohorts had considerably low levels of 
education, and there has been substantial increases in educational attainment of black mothers over time. 
31 The number of households in the PSID were reduced substantially in the 1997 survey due to 
budget constraints.  Because the marked increase in persistence among blacks starts in 1997, this finding 
is suspect.  However, when estimating equation (1) for individuals aged 25-29, the increase in persistence 
occurs in 1993.  This is evidence against the argument that the increase in persistence is a result of the 
1997 changes to the PSID. 
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Each variable is as defined in equation (1), and S is a sample indicator that takes a value of 0 if 
the individual is an NLSY79 respondent and a value of 1 if the individual is an NLSY97 
respondent. I include this sample indicator to allow for educational increases over time when 
estimating the ITE.  I include an interaction of mother’s years of schooling and the sample 
indicator to test whether the ITE has changed over time.  A positive and significant estimate of 
𝛽3 would indicate that there has been an increase in educational persistence.  I estimate the ITE 
in 1993 using the NLSY79 cohort and in 2013 using the NLSY97 cohort.  As with the PSID 
estimates, I first present estimates for all individuals, and then for each race separately.  Results 
from this regression are found in Table 4. 
Similar to the findings from the PSID, I find that the ITE has remained unchanged in the 
general population between the two cohorts.  The ITE is high among whites in 1993 and 
exhibits no significant change in 2013.  It is low among blacks, but increases profoundly between 
1993 and 2013, nearly doubling in magnitude.32   
b. Transition Probabilities 
Thus far, I have presented a stark contrast in educational persistence changes over time 
within whites and blacks in the U.S.  While tempting, it is not meaningful to make comparisons 
of the ITE, in the same period, between races (Mazumder, 2011).  A measure of mobility for a 
particular group only describes the rate at which children revert to that particular group’s mean, 
                                                 
32 Rising incarceration rates among black men in the 1990s may be partly driving these findings.  
However, these trends  are still apparent when estimating the ITE separately by gender and race. 
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and not to society in general.33  If a disadvantaged group experienced an increase in its mobility 
over time, this may initially seem like a good thing.  However, if the mean education level among 
this group remains low compared to the rest of society, then this would not imply improved 
overall mobility for this group. 
Transition matrices, on the other hand, are useful for making racial comparisons between 
subpopulations at a given point in time and have been used for this purpose in previous research 
of income mobility (e.g. Hertz, 2005).  Racial comparisons are meaningful with transition 
matrices because comparisons are made between the educational achievements of black and 
white children who had mothers of a fixed education class (e.g. mothers with less than a high 
school degree).  Additionally, transition matrices describe how upwardly or downwardly mobile 
individuals are.  This is important for characterizing the increase in educational persistence 
among blacks.  Clearly, higher persistence among children whose mothers have high levels of 
education would be preferred to higher persistence among children whose mothers have low 
levels of education.   
I construct education transition matrices to describe upward and downward mobility by race 
and over time in Table 5.  In each 3x3 matrix, I present three distributions of child’s educational 
attainment conditional on the mother’s educational attainment, and each column sums to one.34  
                                                 
33 As noted in a previous footnote, the opposite of intergenerational persistence is called 
intergenerational mobility.  For this sub-section and the next, it will be easier to discuss findings in terms 
of mobility rather than persistence. 
34 Some columns do not exactly to one due to non-response by the respondent.  The largest instance 
of nonresponse (2.85%) occurs in the distribution of black children in 2013 who had mothers with 9-12 
years of schooling. 
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I choose categories of 0-11, 12-15, and 16-20 years of schooling, that is, less than a high school 
degree, at least a high school degree but not a college degree, and at least a college degree. 
I will show that there has been a polarization in education towards either not finishing high 
school or completing college in the general population.  I will also present results that 
demonstrate that this polarization in education is more profound among blacks than whites.  
Finally, the polarization in education is somewhat worrisome overall because the percentage 
point increases in downward mobility are bigger than the increases in upward mobility. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the education transition matrix for the entire population aged 
29-33 in 1993 and 2013.  Numbers along the downward-sloping diagonal are the probabilities 
that children obtained the same education level of their mothers.  Numbers above the diagonal 
are the probabilities that children are downwardly mobile.  Numbers below the diagonal are the 
probabilities that children are upwardly mobile. 
I will discuss aggregate trends by closely examining Panel A.  The leftmost columns of Panel 
A’s matrices are the probabilities of children reaching a particular educational class if their 
mothers had 0-11 years of schooling in 1993 and 2013.  The percentage of these children who 
remain at 0-11 years of schooling was 22.5% and increased to 35.1%.  The percentage of 
children who obtain 12-15 years of schooling was 71.1% and decreased to 49.6%.  Finally, the 
change in the percentage of children who obtained 16-20 years of schooling was 6.4% and more 
than doubled to 13.4%.  Nonetheless, when analyzing the differences between 2013 and 1993, 
the large decrease in the percentage of children with 12-15 years of schooling was marked by a 
bigger increase in the percentage of children who obtained 0-11 years of schooling (12.6%) than 
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those who obtained 16-20 years (7.0%).  By comparison of the figures in the left-most columns 
of Panel A alone, there has been an overall decrease in upward mobility between 1993 and 2013 
for children of mothers who have 0-11 years of schooling.35   
Moving to the middle columns of the matrices for 1993 and 2013 in Panel A represents 
distributions of educational attainment of children whose mothers had 12-15 years of schooling.  
In this category, 6.3% of individuals declined in educational attainment relative to their mothers, 
only obtained 0-11 years of schooling in 1993.  This figure has unfortunately increased to 14.8% 
in 2013.  There has also been an increase in the percentage of respondents in this category who 
improved to 16-20 years of schooling, moving from 27.4% to 32.6%.  The decrease in immobile 
children, those who obtained 12-15 years of schooling, declined from 66.4% to 51.7%.  
However, this decrease was a result of a bigger difference in the percentage of children who 
downwardly mobile (8.6%) than the difference in the percentage of children who are upwardly 
mobile (5.2%).  Thus there has been an overall reduction in upward mobility among children of 
mothers with 12-15 years of schooling. 
Moving to the rightmost columns of the 1993 and 2013 matrices in Panel A represents 
distributions of educational attainment for children whose mothers had 16-20 years of 
schooling.  In this category there has been a subtle increase in downward mobility.  Only 1.1% 
of children in this category obtained 0-11 years of schooling in 1993, and this increased to 3.0% 
                                                 
35 Of course, the type of individuals who remain in the 0-11 years of schooling category has likely 
changed as well.  However, the findings from the 12-15 years of schooling category reinforce the findings 
from the 0-11 years of schooling category.  Because of this, I am less concerned that the entirety of my 
results are being driven by selection. 
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in 2013.  There has been a decrease in the percentage of children who obtained 12-15 years of 
schooling (71.1% to 49.6%), and an increase in those remaining obtaining 16-20 years of 
schooling (6.4% to 13.4%).  However, these differences over time are not statistically significant.  
In summary of Panel A, there has been a decrease in upward mobility in the general 
population.36 
I will now discuss racial trends in mobility.  In general, the trends by race are similar to the 
trends in the general population.  For both races, there has been a decrease in upward mobility 
for children whose mothers who have 0-11 years of schooling.  For children of mothers with 12-
15 years of schooling, the gains in upward mobility were more than offset by gains in downward 
mobility, implying a reduction in upward mobility overall.  Finally, for children of mothers with 
16-20 years of schooling, there has been a small increase in downward mobility.  These trends 
for blacks are much bigger in magnitude than for whites.  Most of the racial differences at a 
given point in time as well as the racial differences in the differences over time are statistically 
significant at the 99% level.37 
Panel B displays mobility matrices in 1993 and 2013 for whites.  The magnitude and changes 
in mobility for whites largely reflect aggregate trends described above.  Panel C displays mobility 
matrices in 1993 and 2013 for blacks.  Comparing the left-most columns of Panel B and Panel C 
shows that for children of mothers with 0-11 years of schooling, blacks used to be more 
upwardly mobile than whites.  An easy way to see this is to note that 23% of whites in the 
                                                 
36 These findings, and the findings by race are still realized when accounting for the number of 
individuals who are a part of each cell.  That is, in percentage of individuals, these findings also hold. 
37 Table available on request. 
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mothers with 0-11 years of schooling category were immobile in 1993 compared to 18.0% of 
blacks.  Moving to 2013, this has reversed, with whites now being more upwardly mobile than 
blacks in this group.  In 2013, 36.5% of whites in this category are immobile, but blacks are 
faring worse with 43.5% in this category being immobile. 
For children of mothers with 12-15 years of schooling in 1993, whites are less immobile than 
blacks (50% vs. 55.9%).  Whites also have greater upward mobility (29.1%) than downward 
mobility (5.8%).  In this category, blacks also have more upward mobility than downward 
mobility in 1993, but blacks are more downwardly mobile than whites (8.3% vs 5.8%).  
Moreover, the percentage of blacks who are upwardly mobile (15.7%) is less than for whites 
(29.1%).  While immobility in this category has declined for both whites and blacks, the figures 
from 2013 still show whites having more upward mobility and less downward mobility than 
blacks.  When examining the net change over time for children of mothers with 12-15 years of 
schooling, blacks have experienced a greater increase in downward mobility than whites. 
Finally, for children of mothers with 16-20 years of schooling there are no substantial 
changes over time.  One thing to note is that whites have had and continue to have greater 
immobility in this category.  In 1993, 66.9% of whites in this category obtained 16-20 years of 
schooling.  Only 49.4% of blacks were able to do the same.  While there has been improvement 
over time, blacks are still less immobile in this category than whites.38   
                                                 
38 Children of mothers who have 16-20 years of schooling and obtained either 12-15 years of 
schooling or 16-20 years of schooling do not show any statistically significant change over time among 
whites or blacks.  However, the racial differences for these children in a given point in time are significant 
at the 99% level and the racial differences in the changes over time are also significant at the 99% level. 
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In summary of racial trends, blacks have experienced an increase in downward mobility in 
the mothers with 0-11 years of schooling category.  For the 12-15 years of schooling category, 
black have and continue to face more downward mobility than whites and less upward mobility 
than whites.  For the 16-20 years of category, there has not been substantial change over time; 
however, whites continue to have greater immobility in this category than blacks.  These trends 
illustrate a story of greater polarization in education.  This is most clearly seen when calculating 
the stationary distributions of the transition matrices.  These stationary distributions are 
presented in Figure 3.39  For the entire population and for every race, the percentage of 
individuals having 12-15 years of schooling is less using 2013 transition probabilities than the 
transition probabilities from 1993.  Moreover, the percentage of individuals having 0-11 years of 
schooling or 16-20 years of schooling is greater when using the 2013 transition probabilities than 
the transition probabilities from 1993.  The stationary distributions also show a trend towards 
stronger polarization among blacks than whites.   
c. Directional Mobility 
Based on previous work by Formby, Smith and Zheng (2004), Bhattacharya and Mazumder 
(2011), I develop upward and downward educational mobility measures that are arguably more 
insightful than transition matrices.  These measures are not as sensitive to cut off points because 
they track upward and downward movement of at least a certain amount and not whether or not 
an individual exited a particular education class.  These measures are also useful because they are 
                                                 
39 The stationary distribution, 𝜋, of a transition matrix 𝑃 is simply the solution to 𝜋 = 𝜋𝑃. 
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directional, either upward or downward, and can often be easier to interpret than net changes in 
transition probabilities. 
As Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) explain, their measures of mobility, named 
directional rank mobility, may be more appropriate when making racial comparisons in mobility.  
In the context of education with discrete, time-invariant cutoff points, I call these measures 
directional educational mobility.  Directional educational mobility can be defined for both upward 
and downward mobility.  Upward educational mobility is defined as: 
𝑈𝑈𝑀𝜏,𝑠1,𝑆2 = Pr (𝑌1 − 𝑌0 ≥ 𝜏|𝑠1 ≤ 𝑌0 ≤ 𝑠2)                 (3).  
Where 𝑌1 is the child’s level of education, 𝑌0 is the mother’s level of education, 𝜏 is an arbitrary 
amount of education needed to qualify an individual as moving up, and 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are the cutoffs 
of education class considered, in this study, 0 and 11, 12 and 15, or 16 and 20 years of schooling.  
The simplest case is when 𝜏 = 1, which simply makes UEM mean the probability that a child has 
more education than his mother.   
Upward education mobility measures the probability of moving up in the distribution by a 
specific amount and does not depend on which cutoffs are used for the transition matrix.  For 
example, consider the group of mothers with 0-11 years of schooling.  Suppose there is a mother 
in this group who had 10 years of schooling whose child managed to obtain 12 years of 
schooling.  Suppose also, that there is a mother in this group with 0 years of schooling whose 
child managed to obtain 9 years of schooling.  The transition matrices as I constructed them in 
Table 5, would label the first child as being upwardly mobile while labeling the second child as 
  
 
 
 
 
75 
being immobile despite the second child obtaining more education than his mother in absolute 
terms.  This occurs because of the choice to use 11 years of schooling as a cutoff point of my 
transition matrix.  Upward education mobility would, however, count both children as being 
upwardly mobile if 𝜏 = 1, and only the second child as being upwardly mobile if 𝜏 = 3 regardless 
of which cutoffs I choose.   
Setting 𝜏 = 1 may not be the most appropriate given rising average education levels of 
individuals as documented in Tables 2 and 3.  Therefore I also consider values of 𝜏 = 2 and𝜏 =3.  For upward education mobility, one should be aware that for the group of individuals whose 
mothers have 16-20 years of schooling, the upper bound of 20 years will limit the amount of 
upward education mobility by construction, especially when 𝜏 is big.   
Table 6 displays measures of upward rank mobility by race and education level of 
respondents’ mothers in the NLSY79 and NLSY97.  Mechanically, as 𝜏 is increased, fewer 
individuals will be upwardly mobile.  A clear contrast is illustrated between the two cohorts.  
Blacks whose mothers have 0-11 years of schooling are either more upwardly mobile or as 
mobile as whites in the NLSY79 cohort depending on the level of 𝜏 used.  However, between 
cohorts, upward mobility declined for blacks relative to whites in this category so much that they 
are much less upwardly mobile than whites in the NLSY97 cohort.  For the other categories, 
whites have been more upwardly mobile than blacks, and while the white-black difference in 
upward mobility may have declined, whites continue to be more upwardly mobile than blacks in 
the NLSY97 cohort.  The only significant change between cohorts in the white-black difference 
between cohorts are among children of mothers with 0-11 years of schooling. 
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Similar to equation (3), one can construct downward education mobility: 
 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝜏,𝑠 = Pr (𝑌0 − 𝑌1 ≥ 𝜏|𝑠1 ≤ 𝑌0 ≤ 𝑠2)      (4). 
A bounding issue is also present when tracking downward education mobility for the group of 
individuals whose mothers have 0-11 years of schooling.  The lower bound of 0 years of 
schooling may limit the amount of downward education mobility by construction, especially 
when 𝜏 is big.   
Table 7 displays measures of downward rank mobility by race and cohort.  In the NLSY79 
cohort, there is little downward mobility in the category of mothers with 0-11 years of schooling 
for both whites and blacks.  There is also no significant white-black difference.  For children of 
mothers with 12-15 or 16-20 years of schooling in the NLSY79 cohort, blacks are more 
downwardly mobile than whites.  Moving to the NLSY97 cohort, downward mobility for 
children of mothers with 0-11 and 12-15 years of schooling has grown over time for both whites 
and blacks.  In any category, blacks are more downwardly mobile than whites.  The only 
significant change over time in the white-black difference occurs among children of mothers 
with 0-11 years of schooling. 
The main conclusion drawn from the transition probabilities in Table 5 and the directional 
mobility measures in Tables 6 and 7 is that the documented increase in persistence among blacks 
in recent decades is a worrisome trend.  Upward educational mobility has decreased among 
blacks whose mothers have less than a high school education.  For blacks with mothers who 
have at least a high school degree, they remain less upwardly mobile than whites.  Additionally, 
there continues to be greater downward mobility among blacks than among whites. 
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IV. Changes in Family Structure 
A possible explanation for increased educational persistence among blacks could lie in the 
change in family structure among blacks.  Table 2 lists the percentage of households by the type 
of parentage respondents in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 grew up in.  In the general population 
and in each race, there has been a decline in the percentage of two-parent households.  Among 
blacks, the decline in two-parent households is the largest. 
Because I use mother’s years of schooling as the key explanatory variable when estimating 
the ITE, it could be that black mothers have a greater ability to transmit their educational 
attainment to their children because there is no father in the household.  To explore whether my 
findings are being driven by the change in household composition I estimate the ITE as I do in 
Table 4, but separately by household type.  Results from this exercise are presented in Table 8. 
Educational persistence in education increases among blacks in both two-parent and single-
parent households. This is evidence against the role of changing household structure being a 
factor that has contributed to rising educational persistence among blacks.  To more formally 
show this, I pool all household types and control for whether a respondent was part of a two-
parent household.  Results from this regression are presented in the last four columns of Table 
8.  The importance of growing up in a two-parent households is important for one’s educational 
attainment and has grown in importance between the two cohorts.  This is indicated by the 
positive and significant estimated coefficients on the two-parent indicator and the interaction 
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term of the two-parent indicator and NLSY97 sample indicator.   Nonetheless, the increase in 
educational persistence among blacks above and beyond this still remains. 
V. Racial Trends in Income Mobility 
Though income and education are usually positively correlated, the big increase in 
educational persistence among blacks is not matched by a big increase in income persistence.  
To demonstrate this, I build on work by Lee and Solon (2009).40  The authors use the PSID to 
estimate the intergenerational elasticity of income for sons and daughters aged 25-48 between 
1977 and 2000.  I replicate their methodology and extend their analysis to 2012.  Estimates for 
this exercise are presented in Figure 2A. 41   
Clearly, there has been no large increase or decrease in income mobility, even throughout the 
2008 financial crisis.  I then take the sample used to estimate the figures presented in Figure 2 
and estimate the intergenerational elasticity of income over time by race.  These estimates and 
their 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 2B and Figure 2C.  There has been 
relatively little change in income mobility among blacks when compared to the change in 
educational mobility among blacks.   
Figure 2 describes mobility for a large birth cohort bracket, individuals aged 25-48.  Lee and 
Solon (2009) use this large bracket to provide more precise estimates of the intergenerational 
                                                 
40 Please refer to Lee and Solon (2009) for a description of their sample and econometric 
specification. 
41 Lee and Solon (2009) estimate the intergenerational elasticity of income separately by sex and only 
using the SEO sample.  However, the bulk of my paper is concerned with racial trends and differences 
and not gender.  Because of this, the replication of their estimates and my extension of estimates for 
2002-2012 are presented in Appendix E. 
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elasticity of income.  As stated previously, changes in any mobility measure are likely to be more 
pronounced when using narrower birth cohorts.  However, a major reason Lee and Solon used a 
large age bracket was to estimate the intergenerational elasticity of income precisely.  Indeed, 
when I attempt to restrict the bracket of individuals used to generate estimates to 29-33 years old 
as I do when estimating the ITE, many of the standard errors are so large that the estimates are 
not statistically different from zero. 
Thus, I turn to the larger samples of the NLSYs to demonstrate the stability of income 
mobility over time and among blacks when using narrower age bracket.  I estimate the 
intergenerational elasticity of income using the following specification:42  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑖2 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑀^2𝑖 + 𝜀 (5) 
where CRI is the natural log of the child respondent’s real total family income reported in 1993 
or 2013.  PRI is the natural log of parent’s real total family income when surveyed in 1979 or 
1997, 𝑆𝑖 is an indicator for whether the child was part of the NLSY97 survey, and 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑀𝑖 is the 
age of the child’s mother when surveyed in 1979 or 1997.  Results for this regression are found 
in Table 9.  Similar to the findings from the PSID, the intergenerational elasticity of income has 
not significantly changed between 1993 and 2013.   
Finally, I demonstrate that the increase in educational persistence among blacks may not be 
associated with changing income levels.  If family income is important for a child’s educational 
attainment and has become more important over time and family income is positively correlated 
with a mother’s educational attainment, the growing importance of mother’s educational 
                                                 
42 This specification is similar to the one used by Lee and Solon (2009). 
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attainment may merely be capturing the growing importance of family income.  Thus, I present 
the estimates of the ITE while controlling for real family income in Table 10.  Unsurprisingly, 
real family income is positively associated with the educational attainment of respondents.  
Additionally, it is true that the importance of real family income has risen for the NLSY97 
cohort in general and among whites.  However, controlling for the level of family income does 
not alter this paper’s main finding:  educational persistence has risen greatly among blacks, albeit 
less so than when not controlling for family income. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The mechanism determining what level of education an individual is able to obtain is multi-
faceted but strongly associated with his or her parent’s level of education.  In this study, I 
analyze this association, the intergenerational transmission of education, in the United States in a 
number of different ways through the lens of race.  It is especially important to consider this 
view of educational mobility in the United States given the racial history of education and 
education policy in the United States.  My estimates of the intergenerational transmission of 
education in the United States are, to my knowledge, the most recent to date. 
I first highlight the different histories of educational mobility within races, uncovering a large 
increase in educational persistence among blacks.  This increase is not observed among whites.  
Through transition matrices and new directional measures of mobility, I am able to characterize 
changes in education mobility over time.  Black children whose mothers have less than a high 
school education today have a lower probability of getting at least a high school degree than they 
did 20 years ago.  For children whose mothers had at least a high school degree, whites have had 
and continue to have a higher probability of being upwardly mobile than blacks.  Thus the 
marked increase in educational persistence is largely a worrisome trend.   
Changing family structure does not appear to be the cause behind the increase in black 
educational persistence and the racial trends educational mobility are not apparent in racial 
trends in income mobility.  Given that educational and income inequality are not very correlated 
across countries (Morrisson and Murtin, 2013), this discrepancy must not necessarily be 
reconciled.  Moreover, research on the effects of desegregation policy on education and income 
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mobility have shown that income and educational mobility do not necessarily follow the same 
trends (Bloome and Western, 2011).  Identifying the cause of the increase in black educational 
persistence is an important area for future research, especially if it is rooted in public policy.  The 
findings of this paper suggest that programs directed at improving the educational outcomes for 
children who have parents with low education should be evaluated on their efficacy and if 
effective, increased in scale.43 
  
                                                 
43 The Advancement Via Individual Determination is a non-profit organization that directs support 
to students in high school wishing to pursue college given that they will be the first generation in their 
family to attend college.  In light of this paper’s findings, such a program may mitigate the decline in 
upward mobility experienced among children whose parents do not have a high school degree, especially 
among blacks. 
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Author(s) Year Data Birth Cohort(s) Year(s) Estimated Regression Point 
Estimate
Correlation
Huang 2013 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1964-71, 1974-81 1996, 2007 .15-.42 .43-50
Behrman & 
Rosenzwig
2002 Minnesota Twin Registry 1936-55 1994 0.332-.466 -
Plug 2004 Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey 1956-79 (Approximately) 1992 .267-.538 -
Altonji & Dunn 1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
NLS Young Men, NLS Young 
1913-65, 1942-52, 1944-54 1968-89, 1966-81, 1968-88 
(Pooled)
- .33-.58
Couch and Dunn 2007 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1948-68 (Approximately) .255-.368 .402-.431
Hertz 2007 International Social Survey 
Programme
1929-80 1932, 1937,…,1977 .4-.5 .35-.5
Pena 2011 Health & Retirement Study, 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study
1967-, 1979- 1992, 2004 .275-.499 -
Olneck 1977 Kalamazoo Sample 1917-39 1973 - .383-.423
Table 1 - Selected U.S. Studies of the Intergenerational Transmission of Education
Note: This table lists major studies of the intergenerational transmission of education in the United States by author and year of publication.  In some studies authors present 
regression estimates of the coefficient on parental education when regressing child's education on parental education.  Other studies present correlation coefficients between child 
and parental education.
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n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Individual's Years of Schooling 6,008 12.92 2.39 2,997 13.4 2.5 1,828 12.7 2.0 1,183 12.22 2.42
Mother's Years of Schooling 5,646 10.8 3.21 2,872 11.9 2.4 1,673 10.8 2.5 1,101 7.90 4.07
Mother's Age 5,834 42.92 6.82 2,924 43.2 6.5 1,761 42.5 7.2 1,149 42.74 7.00
Two Parent Household Indicator 6,009 0.77 0.42 2,997 0.88 0.3 1,828 0.58 0.5 1,184 0.76 0.43
Panel B: NLSY97
Individual's Years of Schooling 7,048 13.67 2.99 3,607 14.3 3.0 1,934 13.1 2.0 1,507 13.05 2.79
Mother's Years of Schooling 6,353 12.53 2.96 3,335 13.5 2.5 1,687 12.5 2.5 1,331 10.28 3.66
Mother's Age 6,325 39.94 5.65 3,281 40.6 5.3 1,671 39.0 7.2 1,373 39.58 5.68
Two Parent Household Indicator 7,141 0.61 0.49 3,637 0.73 0.4 1,973 0.38 0.5 1,531 0.63 0.48
Note: This table lists the number of observations and means and standard deviations for individual years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, and mother's age in the the
         NLSY79 and NLSY97.  The first three columns display figures for each survey when combining all races.  The remaining columns display these figures by race.  The 
         number of observations is differs depending on which variable is being described.  For example, in the NLSY79 among all races, more mothers report their age than their 
         years of schooling.
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics from the NLSY79 and NLSY97
Panel A: NLSY79 All Races Whites Blacks Hispanics
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Year n Mean Yrs. 
Schooling
Std. Deviation Mean Mother's 
Yrs. Schooling
Std. Deviation n Mean Yrs. 
Schooling
Std. Deviation Mean Mother's 
Yrs. Schooling
Std. Deviation
1980 1,047 13.32 2.16 11.54 2.93 591 11.91 1.98 9.07 2.71
1981 1,057 13.28 2.09 11.45 2.71 653 11.94 1.91 9.07 2.73
1982 1,115 13.19 2.05 11.51 2.75 717 12.01 1.89 9.29 2.62
1983 1,173 13.12 2.11 11.53 2.66 794 12.09 1.92 9.36 2.76
1984 1,274 13.11 2.10 11.53 2.66 813 12.10 1.86 9.47 2.71
1985 1,318 13.35 2.15 11.48 2.63 813 12.39 1.91 9.62 2.77
1986 1,323 13.32 2.15 11.61 2.65 832 12.43 1.90 9.81 2.75
1987 1,248 13.24 2.14 11.58 2.59 840 12.40 1.97 9.86 2.78
1988 1,235 13.24 2.14 11.65 2.58 855 12.41 1.86 9.90 2.70
1989 1,206 13.29 2.08 11.76 2.57 845 12.47 1.84 10.04 2.82
1990 1,574 12.76 2.63 11.84 2.52 804 12.41 1.85 10.06 2.78
1991 1,483 12.77 2.53 11.81 2.58 783 12.37 1.67 10.17 2.70
1992 1,520 12.80 2.53 11.98 2.55 764 12.35 1.65 10.25 2.68
1993 1,467 12.83 2.51 12.04 2.52 755 12.35 1.63 10.46 2.53
1994 1,424 13.04 2.43 12.11 2.43 716 12.37 1.63 10.60 2.31
1995 1,283 13.02 2.33 12.10 2.40 677 12.35 1.81 10.70 2.25
1996 1,011 13.28 2.10 12.17 2.33 603 12.51 1.80 10.83 2.25
1997 712 13.41 2.22 12.42 2.18 393 12.65 1.93 10.79 2.17
1999 709 13.54 2.18 12.67 2.02 363 12.84 1.84 10.92 2.30
2001 778 13.62 2.09 12.77 2.06 346 12.71 1.77 11.28 2.05
2003 831 13.70 2.02 12.78 2.22 407 12.80 1.86 11.70 1.87
2005 924 13.56 2.29 12.87 2.19 466 12.83 1.81 11.95 1.71
2007 995 13.65 2.17 13.00 2.14 507 12.96 1.87 12.03 1.74
2009 1,155 14.08 2.17 13.16 2.27 655 13.27 1.99 12.07 1.92
2011 1,183 14.22 2.05 13.24 2.41 705 13.21 1.98 12.22 1.89
2013 1,145 14.30 2.16 13.20 2.74 750 13.33 2.05 12.42 1.91
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics from the PSID 1978-2013
Whites Blacks
Note: Mean years of schooling is the average years of schooling of PSID respondents aged 27-31 in each survey year.  Mean mother's years of schooling is the average years of schooling of mothers
           of these respondents.  Figures are from the combined SRC, SEO, Latino, and Immigrant samples.
  
 
 
 
 
89 
Table 4 - ITE Estimates from the NLSYs, Individuals Aged 29-33 
Variable All Whites Blacks Hispanics 
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.392*** 0.475*** 0.263*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.02) (0.023) 
NLSY97 Sample Indicator -0.026 0.436 -3.067*** 0.142 
 
(0.238) (0.375) (0.518) (0.305) 
Mother's Years of Schooling * Indicator 0.02 -0.017 0.247*** 0.029 
 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.043) (0.031) 
Constant 8.747*** 7.766*** 9.902*** 10.814*** 
 
(0.144) (0.225) (0.223) (0.204) 
n 11,923 6,180 3,329 2,414 
Note: This table presents estimates of the ITE in 1993 and 2013 by pooling the NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples.  The  
dependent variable is the respondent's years of schooling as reported in 1993 or 2013 when respondents are     29-33 
years old.  Robust standard errors are reported below each estimate.  ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs
0-11 Yrs 22.5 6.3 1.1 35.1 14.8 3.0 12.6*** 8.6*** 1.8***
12-15 Yrs 71.1 66.4 33.5 49.6 51.7 29.0 -21.5*** -14.7*** -4.4
16-20 Yrs 6.4 27.4 65.4 13.4 32.6 67.3 7.0*** 5.2*** 1.9
0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs
0-11 Yrs 23.0 5.8 0.9 36.5 13.7 2.6 13.4*** 7.9*** 1.8***
12-15 Yrs 70.7 65.1 32.2 47.0 50.0 27.9 -23.7*** -15.1*** -4.3
16-20 Yrs 6.3 29.1 66.9 15.5 35.5 68.8 9.2*** 6.4*** 1.9
0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs
0-11 Yrs 18.0 8.3 3.8 43.5 19.6 6.1 25.5*** 11.3*** 2.2***
12-15 Yrs 75.0 76.0 46.8 43.0 55.9 35.8 -32.0*** -20.1*** -10.9
16-20 Yrs 7.0 15.7 49.4 9.1 23.3 57.1 2.2 7.6*** 7.8
0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs 0-11 Yrs 12-15 Yrs 16-20 Yrs
0-11 Yrs 27.2 13.5 3.1 28.2 15.8 4.1 1.1 2.2 1
12-15 Yrs 66.7 69.6 40.4 57.4 57.2 39.2 -9.2*** -12.4*** -1.2
16-20 Yrs 6.0 16.8 56.6 12.6 26.3 56.7 6.5*** 9.5*** 0.2
Note: Figures come from the NSLY79 and NLSY97 for individuals aged 29-33 in 1993 and 2013.  Mother's education is measured in each survey's base year, 
1979 or 1997.  Each column in any 3x3 matrix is a conditional education distribution of respondents given their mother's education.
Panel C: Blacks
Panel D: Hispanics
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Table 5 - Education Transition Matrices by Race 
in 1993 and 2013, individuals aged 29-33
Mother's Years of Schooling
Panel A: All Races
Panel B: Whites
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1993 2013
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Panel A: NLSY79 Whites Blacks W-B Whites Blacks W-B
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling 87.3*** 90.3*** -3.0* 67.9*** 68.7*** -0.9
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 49.4*** 41.1*** 8.3*** 39.3*** 31.0*** 8.2***
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. of Schooling 27.9*** 16.1*** 11.8** 20.0*** 10.8*** 9.2**
Mothers with any Yrs. of Schooling 57.0*** 65.1*** -8.1*** 44.7*** 49.4*** -4.7***
Panel B:  NLSY97
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling 74.7*** 62.6*** 12.1*** 58.5*** 45.6*** 12.9***
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 55.2*** 49.4*** 5.8*** 45.3*** 36.6*** 8.7***
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. Of Schooling 32.8*** 27.7*** 5.2 21.8*** 19.7*** 2.1
Mothers with any Yrs. of Schooling 51.7*** 49.6*** 2.1 40.8*** 36.6*** 4.2***
Change (NLSY97 - NLSY79)
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling -12.6*** -27.7*** 15.0*** -9.4*** -23.1*** 13.8***
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 5.8*** 8.3*** -2.6 6.0*** 5.6** 0.4
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. Of Schooling 4.9 11.6** -6.6 1.8 8.9* -7.1
Mothers with any Yrs. of Schooling -5.3*** -15.5*** 10.2*** -3.9*** -12.8*** 8.9***
Note: These figures are probabilities of individuals increased their educational attainment by at least τ more than their mothers.  Probabilities are presented for NLSY79 and 
NLSY97 respondents by educational attainment of their mothers and race.  Two values of τ are considered.  For each value of τ, the last column shows the white-black 
difference in probabilities.  For mothers with 16-20 years of schooling, the upper bound of 20 years of schooling may reduce the probability by construction, especially for 
larger values of τ.
τ=1 year τ=2 years
Table 6 - Upward Class Mobility
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Panel A: NLSY79 Whites Blacks W-B Whites Blacks W-B Whites Blacks W-B
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling 6.6*** 4.7*** 1.9 3.0*** 2.2*** 0.8 0.9*** 1.2*** -0.3
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 11.5*** 18.6*** -7.1*** 6.5*** 10.2*** -3.7*** 2.8*** 2.8*** 0
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. Of Schooling 43.3*** 64.1*** -20.9*** 34.9*** 47.4*** -12.5* 22.3*** 28.9*** -6.6
Panel B:  NLSY97
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling 18.2*** 26.9*** -8.7*** 7.2*** 16.1*** -9.0*** 2.1*** 4.1*** -2.0
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 25.0*** 29.6*** -4.6*** 16.5*** 19.7*** -3.2** 9.1*** 10.7*** -1.6
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. Of Schooling 45.9*** 56.7*** -10.8** 37.4*** 44.6*** -7.2 23.3*** 32.1*** -8.8**
Change (NLSY97-NLSY79)
Mothers with 0-11 Yrs. of Schooling 11.6*** 22.2*** -10.6*** 4.2*** 13.9*** -9.8*** 1.2 2.9*** -1.7
Mothers with 12-15 Yrs. of Schooling 13.5*** 11.0*** 2.5 10.0*** 9.6*** .4 6.3*** 7.9*** -1.6
Mothers with 16-20 Yrs. Of Schooling 2.6 -7.4 10.1 2.5 -2.8 5.3 1.0 3.2 -2.2
τ=3 years
Note: These figures are probabilities of individuals increased their educational attainment by at least τ more than their mothers.  Probabilities are presented for NLSY79 and 
NLSY97 respondents by educational attainment of their mothers and race.  Two values of τ are considered.  For each value of τ, the last column shows the white-black 
difference in probabilities. .  For mothers with 0-11 years of schooling, the lower bound of 0 years of schooling may reduce the probability, especially for larger values of τ.
Table 7 - Downward Class Mobility
τ=1 year τ=2 years
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All Whites Blacks Hispanics All Whites Blacks Hispanics All Whites Blacks Hispanics
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.404*** 0.484*** 0.267*** 0.187*** 0.33*** 0.416*** 0.241*** 0.194*** 0.387*** 0.473*** 0.26*** 0.184***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.045) (0.032) (0.042) (0.013) (0.019) (0.02) (0.023)
NLSY97 Sample Indicator 0.352 0.678 -2.705*** 0.224 -0.994** -0.89 -3.585*** 0.034 -0.377 -0.008 -2.949*** -0.122
(0.281) (0.423) (0.739) (0.351) (0.446) (0.806) (0.693) (0.633) (0.24) (0.388) (0.504) (0.348)
Mother's Yrs of Schl. * NLSY97 Ind. 0.008 -0.022 0.244*** 0.034 0.069* 0.048 0.289*** 0.016 0.014 -0.018 0.224*** 0.032
(0.022) (0.032) (0.058) (0.036) (0.039) (0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.019) (0.028) (0.042) (0.031)
Two Parent Household Indicator 0.433*** 0.463*** 0.315*** 0.326*
(0.09) (0.139) (0.099) (0.177)
Two Parent Ind. * NLSY97 Ind. 0.665*** 0.65*** 0.526*** 0.376
(0.123) (0.183) (0.176) (0.242)
Constant 8.671*** 7.713*** 9.976*** 10.871*** 9.104*** 8.147*** 9.87*** 10.474*** 8.437*** 7.378*** 9.746*** 10.575***
(0.169) (0.251) (0.297) (0.244) (0.276) (0.525) (0.342) (0.363) (0.151) (0.247) (0.225) (0.236)
n 8,549 5,109 1,705 1,735 3,051 961 1,472 618 11,923 6,180 3,329 2,414
Table 8 - The Intergenerational Transmission of Education Among 
Two-Parent and Single-Parent Households
Two-Parent Households Single-Parent Households All Households
Note: This table presents estimates of the ITE among respondents who grew up in two-parent or single-parent households separately by race.  The final four columns includes the entire pooled NLSY79 and 
NLSY97 samples with an indicator for respondents who grew up in two-parent households.
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All Whites Blacks Hispanics
Log Real Family Income 0.447*** 0.313*** 0.538*** 0.311**
(0.038) (0.045) (0.097) (0.125)
NLSY97 Sample Indicator 0.393 -0.352 -0.63 1.996
(0.631) (0.848) (1.597) (1.462)
Log Real Family Income * Sample Indicator -0.038 0.026 0.026 -0.153
(0.053) (0.071) (0.14) (0.13)
Mother's Age 0.118*** 0.11** 0.018 0.127
(0.036) (0.044) (0.071) (0.103)
Mother's Age^2 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -2.185*** -1.728** -4.855** -1.261
(0.7) (0.781) (2.218) (1.811)
Age^2 0.036*** 0.028** 0.079** 0.021
(0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.029)
Constant 36.901*** 31.706*** 78.252** 24.136
(10.823) (12.076) (34.197) (28.265)
n 7,933 4,296 2,050 1,587
Note: This table presents estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of income by 
regressing the natural log of real income of NLSY79 and NLSY97 respondents when 
aged 29-33 on the natural log of their household income in the survey base year when 
living with their parents.
Table 9 - Estimates of the Intergenerational Elasticity of 
Income, individuals aged 29-33 in 1991 and 2011
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All Whites Blacks Hispanics
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.299*** 0.377*** 0.218*** 0.143***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
NLSY97 Sample Indicator -1.576* -2.964** -3.269*** 3.151**
(0.824) (1.297) (1.152) (1.551)
Mother's Yrs of Schl.* Sample Indicator 0.016 -0.028 0.173*** 0.043
(0.023) (0.034) (0.052) (0.036)
Log Real Family Income 0.584*** 0.659*** 0.404*** 0.605***
(0.056) (0.081) (0.069) (0.122)
Log Real Family Income*Sample Indicator 0.15* 0.313*** 0.109 -0.28*
(0.078) (0.118) (0.112) (0.141)
Constant 2.983 1.128 5.922*** 4.424***
(0.601) (0.896) (0.737) (1.347)
n
Table 10 - ITE Estimates from the NLSYs Controlling for Income, 
Individuals Aged 29-33
Note: This table presents estimates of the ITE in 1993 and 2013 by pooling the NLSY79 
and NLSY97 samples and controlling for the natural log of real family income in both 
periods.  The dependent variable is the respondent's years of schooling as reported in 1993 
or 2013 when respondents are 29-33 years old.  Robust standard errors are reported 
below each estimate.
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Figure 1 – Timeline for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 
 
Note: This figure depicts the timeline in years for the NLSY79 and NLSY97.  For the NLSY79, 
respondents are born in 1960-64 and are first interviewed in 1979 when aged 14-18.  Information 
on mothers, including their educational attainment, is obtained in this first interview.  Information 
on respondents’ educational attainment is collected in 1993 when aged 29-33 and is also the year 
when intergenerational educational persistence is estimated.  The NLSY97 follows a similar 
timeline. 
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Figure 2 – Estimates of Intergenerational Educational Persistence 
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Figure 2A - Estimated ITE Coefficients  
1980-2013, Individuals Aged 29-33 
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Figure 2B - Estimated ITE Coefficients  
1980-2013, White Individuals Aged 29-33 
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Figure 2C- Estimated ITE Coefficients  
1980-2013, Black Individuals Aged 29-33 
Note: These figures present point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the 
intergenerational transmission of education using specification (1).  Starting in 1997, the PSID 
occurred on a biannual basis.  Diamonds show point estimates of the ITE in 1993 and 2013 
from the NLSYs as detailed in Table 4. 
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Figure 3 – Stationary Distributions of Education in 1993 and 2013 
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Note: These figures depict the stationary distributions for the transition matrices 
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Figure 4 – Estimates of the Intergenerational Elasticity of Income 
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Figure 3A - Estimates of  Intergenerational Elasticity 
of  Income, Individuals Aged 25-48 
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Figure 3C - Estimates of  Intergenerational Elasticity 
of  Income, Blacks Aged 25-48 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 3B - Estimates of  Intergenerational Elasticity 
of  Income, Whites Aged 25-48 
Note: These figures present point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the intergenerational income 
Elasticity of income using the baseline specification from Lee and Solon (2009).  Starting in 1997, the PSID 
occurred on a biannual basis. Households reported 2012 income in the 2013 round of the PSID and as such, 
2012 is the last year possible to estimate intergenerational income persistence. 
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Appendix A – Correlations 
In this appendix, I present calculations of correlations between mother’s and child’s years of 
schooling for the PSID and the NLSYs.  In both datasets, these findings point to a similar 
conclusion from estimating the ITE using a regression.  Blacks have experienced a big increase 
in the correlation compared to the general population and whites.  In the NLSYs, blacks are the 
only group to have experienced an increase while whites and Hispanics have experienced a 
decrease.  In the PSID there appears to be a slight increase in the correlation among whites, but 
the increase in the correlation among blacks is bigger in magnitude. 
 
Table A - Correlations of Mother's and Child's 
Years of Schooling in 1993 and 2013 
 
1993 2013 Difference 
All 0.399 0.367 -0.032 
Whites 0.459 0.385 -0.074 
Blacks 0.322 0.374 0.052 
Hispa
nics 0.278 0.247 -0.030 
Note: This table lists spearman correlation coefficients between mother's years of   
schooling and child's years of schooling when aged 29-33 for the NLSY79 (1993) 
and NLSY97 (2013) for the entire sample and separately by race.  Blacks are the 
only group who have seen an increase in the correlation. 
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Figure A – Correlations of Mother’s and Child’s Years of Schooling, 1980-2013 
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Figure A1 - Correlations between Mother's and Child's Years of  
Schooling, 1980-2013, All Individuals Aged 29-33 
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Figure A2 - Correlations Between Mother's and Child's Years of  
Schooling, 1980-2013, Whites Aged 29-33 
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Figure A3 - Correlations Between Mother's and Child's Years of  
Schooling, 1980-2013, Blacks Aged 29-33 
Note: These figures present spearman correlation coefficients between mother’s and child’s 
years of schooling when the child is aged 29-33.  Blacks have exhibited a bigger increase in the 
correlation than whites. 
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Appendix B – 21x21 Transition Matrices 
For completeness, I present 21x21 transition matrices for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 for the 
entire samples and then by race. 
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Appendix C – Missing Data 
Missing data is prevalent in both the NLSY79 and the NLSY97.  There are three general 
reasons for having missing data.  The first is the attrition of respondents in the NLSYs.  About 
80% of respondents in both surveys remain and participate in the survey year in which I conduct 
my analyses (1993 for the NLSY79 and 2013 for the NLSY97).  Secondly, respondents who do 
participate in 1993 or 2013 may not report years of schooling.  This is not a major source of 
missing data.  Years of schooling is reported by over 99% of respondents who participate in the 
1993 round of the NLSY79 and over 98.5% of respondents who participate in the 2013 round 
of the NLSY97.  I will not address this source of missing data due to how infrequent it is.  
Finally, mother’s years of schooling may not be recorded in the base year for many reasons 
including a refusal to answer or being deceased.  Table B1 displays the number of observations 
in the base year of each survey and the number of observations that are available in the analysis 
year due to the three circumstances just described. 
Survey weights are included in the NLSYs to construct nationally representative samples 
despite attrition.  I examine several variables including the respondent’s age, sex, race, mother’s 
years of schooling, real family income, an indicator for being in two-parent household, an urban 
indicator, and geography indicators.  I calculate the means of these variables for respondents in 
the base year of the NLSYs using the base year weights.  I then take the sample of respondents 
who participated in the 1993 round of the NLSY79 or the 2013 round of the NLSY97, and 
calculate means of the same variables using the 1993 or 2013 weights.  I then perform a 
weighted t-test to ascertain whether there are any significant differences in means between the 
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baseline and the non-attritted samples.  Table B2 clearly demonstrates the efficacy of the NLSY 
weights.  While slight differences exist, no difference is close to being statistically significant. 
I now examine whether this paper’s main findings are being driven by an absence of 
information on mothers.  To address this, I estimate the probability of a respondent having a 
missing mother on a set of baseline variables available on all respondents in the base year.  These 
variables include race indicators, indicators for household parental type, sex of the individual, 
and age of the individual.  Under a probit specification, I predict the probability an individual 
will have missing years of schooling for his or her mother.  I then weight each observation by 
(1/1-p) to give more weight to individuals who are likely to have mothers with missing years of 
schooling, with p being the probability of having a mother with missing years of schooling.   
I predict probabilities with another specification, this time including also base year variables 
of real family income, geography indicators, and an urban indicator.  Because some individuals 
do not have information recorded for these variables, I am unable to predict the probability for 
having a missing mom for the entire sample.  Nonetheless, for the observations I do have, I 
weight them again by (1/1-p).  I then repeat the regression from Table 4 using these different 
weighting schemes.  Results from this exercise are found in Table B3.  From this exercise, I 
demonstrate that even when giving more weight to individuals who are likely to have mothers 
with missing years of schooling, this paper’s main results hold: intergenerational persistence has 
increased significantly and substantially among blacks, but not among other races. 
A final check on missing years of schooling is to transform the data on mother’s years of 
schooling to an indicator of whether an individual’s mother had above or below the median level 
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of education.  The median years of schooling for observed mothers is 12 years of schooling.  I 
first naively assume that mothers who do not report years of schooling are below the median.  I 
then randomly select a proportion of mothers reporting 12 years of schooling to also be 
included in the subset of mothers who have below median education to force exactly half of the 
sample to have a median indicator variable equal to zero (below the median) and the other half 
of the sample to have the indicator variable equal to 1.  I then run the regression from Equation 
(2), this time using the median indicator instead of mother’s years of schooling.  Results from 
this regression are found in Table B4.  Again, the main conclusion from this paper hold: 
intergenerational persistence has increased significantly and substantially among blacks, but not 
among other races. 
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Appendix D – Data Outliers 
Figures A1-A8 plot mother’s years of schooling vs. child’s years of schooling using cross-
sectional weights.  The size a bubble reflects the number of respondents represented.  Figures 
A1 and A2 are plots of the entire NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples, respectively.  Figures A3-A8 
are plots of the data for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 by race. 
Recall that for the NLSYs, years of schooling is measured as 0 to 20 years of schooling.  
These figures show that there aren’t many individuals who have 0 or 20 years of schooling nor 
individuals with mothers who have 0 or 20 years of schooling.  The group with the highest 
proportion of data lying on the bounds are whites in the NLSY97.  In this group, 6.45% have 
child’s education reported as 0 or 20 years of schooling or mother’s education reported as 0 or 
20 years of schooling (or both).  This paper’s conclusions are not changed when removing these 
observations from the main analyses. 
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Appendix E – Replication of Lee and Solon (2009) 
In this paper, I presented estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of income by race using 
the specification and data from Lee and Solon (2009).  The original paper estimated the 
intergenerational elasticity of income by gender using only the SEO sample.  I replicate the 
findings of their paper and extend their analysis to 2012.  Results are presented in the figures 
below. 
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Figure E1 - Estimates of  Intergenerational Income 
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Figure E2 - Estimates of  Intergenerational Income 
Mobility, Women Aged 25-48 
Note: These figures present estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of income by 
gender following the procedure  
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Abstract 
I use the method introduced by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) to analyze the rate of 
overeducation among workers with exactly a college degree between 2006 and 2013.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to use this method to analyze trends in overeducation during 
the great recession in the U.S.  I find that the proportion of workers with exactly a college 
degree working in occupations offering low college premiums  increased during great recession 
and fell afterwards.  An increase in the rate in overeducation could be due to more college-
educated workers working in noncollege occupations that were noncollege in the past or because 
there was an increase in the number of noncollege occupations.  I show that changes in the rate 
of overeducation are mostly due mostly to the latter.  When shutting the down the flexibility for 
occupations to change from college to noncollege (and vice versa), the rate of overeducation 
increases only slightly between 2006 and 2013.  Regardless, these findings run contrary to the 
secular decline of the rate of overeducation during the end of 20th century documented by 
previous research. 
 
Keywords: Overeducation, College, Premium, Recession 
JEL Classification: J24, I26 
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I. Background and Summary 
Traditionally, a worker is said to be overeducated (or underemployed) when he or she has 
more education than what is required for his or her job.  Knowing the prevalence of 
overeducation is important for policy because overeducation may represent misallocated 
resources in an economy (McGuinness, 2008).  Such inefficiency could arise due to job search 
and labor market frictions (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011).  Under these scenarios, overeducated 
workers may not as easily recoup the cost of their educational investments if their surplus 
educational investments do not bring commensurate productivity and wage gains.  There are 
numerous methods that have been employed to determine whether a worker is overeducated 
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Rumberger, 1987; Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989; Kiker et al., 1997).  
The general finding from these studies is that overeducated workers usually earn more than 
workers in the same job who are not overeducated.  Also, overeducated workers earn less than 
similarly educated workers who work in jobs that require higher levels of education.   
Three popular approaches have been used to measure the rate of overeducation in a country.  
The first approach relies on surveys that asked respondents what level of education was required 
for their jobs, and an individual is determined to be overeducated if he or she reports having 
more education than what they say is required for his or her job (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; 
Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Hartog, 1986; Sicherman, 1991; Alba-Ramirez, 1993).  This 
worker self-assessment method, while insightful, is subject to biases.  For example, workers may 
easily overstate the level of education actually required or they may simply mirror requirements 
as stated by their employer than what is actually required for a job (Hartog, 2000).  A second 
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approach has relied on the work of professional job analysts, instead of survey respondents, to 
determine the required level of education is for specific occupations (Rumberger, 1987; Kiker 
and Santos, 1991).    However, the reliability of professional job analysts, especially over long 
time-frames, has been called into question (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1992).  The third approach 
relies on statistical methods to determine whether a worker is overeducated.  In these methods, 
workers who have above the mode or mean plus one standard deviation of the educational level 
in their occupation are determined to be overeducated. While these methods may be more 
agnostic than using the worker self-assessment or professional job analyst methods, they are not 
rooted in economic theory and are problematic if distributional changes in education levels in an 
occupation are not reflective of the changing educational requirements of that occupation. 
An alternative approach proposed by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) relies on classifying 
occupations by the earnings premiums they offer to college graduates.  An occupation is said to 
be noncollege if it offers a college earnings premium below an arbitrarily low threshold to 
college-educated workers.  Then the rate of overeducation among college-educated workers is 
the proportion of these college-educated workers who are employed in noncollege occupations.  
Rather than focus on the prevalence of excess skills among workers, this approach focuses on 
the prevalence of workers who on average are not able to easily recoup the cost of their 
educational investments through college earnings premiums.  Consistent with skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC), he finds that there was a secular decline in the rate of 
overeducation between 1983 and 1994.  Cardoso (2007) finds a similar trend using this method 
in Portugal from 1986-1999. 
  
 
 
 
 
125 
In this paper, I use the method of Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) to analyze overeducation 
in 2006-2013.  To my knowledge, this study is the first that provides calculations of the rate of 
overeducation using this method during the great recession in the U.S.44  I use the American 
Community Survey (ACS) for my analysis.  One clear benefit of the ACS is the sheer number of 
observations available in every year.  Because of this, I am able to more narrowly define 
occupations than Gottschalk and Hansen (2003).  This should lead to a clearer delineation of 
college and noncollege occupations. 
The trend in what one should expect in overeducation during the great recession may not be 
immediately obvious.  On one hand, people could be competing for a dwindling number of jobs 
leading some to unemployment and others to secure employment in jobs where they are 
overeducated (Modestino et al., 2015).  On the other hand, there has been evidence of rapid 
SBTC in some occupations during recessions in the past 25 years including the great recession 
(Hershbein and Kahn, 2016).  Such rapid SBTC might have propped up college premiums for 
some occupations during the great recession. 
I find that the rate of overeducation increased during the great recession and fell afterwards 
when designating workers earning less than 25% of the aggregate college premium as being 
overeducated.  A key feature of this method is that an increase in the rate of overeducation 
could be due to an increase in the number of college-educated workers employed in noncollege 
                                                 
44 O’Leary and Sloane (2014) use the same method to study overeducation during the great recession 
in the UK and find similar results to this paper.  Fogg and Harrington (2011) use the American 
Community Survey to analyze overeducation during the great recession using a mixture of the job analyst 
and statistical approaches and find an increase in the rate of overeducation. 
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occupations that were noncollege in the past or an increase in the number of noncollege 
occupations themselves (or both).  When decomposing shifts in the rate of overeducation into 
these two types of shifts, I show that the year-to-year changes in the rate of overeducation are 
mostly due to changes in the number of occupations being reclassified as noncollege.  When 
holding the classification of occupations constant, I find that there is only a slight increase in the 
rate of overeducation in my time period.  These results run contrary to the secular decline in the 
rate of overeducation in the late 20th century found by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) and 
Cardoso (2007).  However, they are concordant with findings of O’Leary and Sloane (2014) who 
use the same method to study overeducation during the great recession in the UK. 
 
II. Data 
I use the American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate the rate of overeducation in the 
United States.  I use the 2005-2014 ACS samples to estimate the aggregate college premium and 
within-occupation college premiums in every year from 2006 to 2013.  Thus my time frame will 
cover the period before, during, and after the great recession in the United States.  Though the 
ACS started in 2000, it was not fully implemented until 2005.  I choose to exclude the ACS 
samples from 2000-2004 because of substantially smaller number of survey participants in these 
samples compared to the number of survey participants in the 2005-2014 samples.45  Having a 
large number of observations in every survey year is important for me to precisely estimate 
                                                 
45 The number of observations in each ACS sample from 2000-2004 is less than 1.2 million while the 
number of observations in each ACS sample from 2005-2014 is greater than 3 million. 
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within-occupation college premiums for a large number of narrowly defined occupations.  I use 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) occupation classification which provides a 
time-invariant occupation classification system for all ACS survey years.  The IPUMS 
occupations are more narrowly defined than the 3-digit Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) system used by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) and can easily be aggregated to the 3-digit 
2010 SOC system.46 
I use a comparable sample to the one used by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003).  My sample 
includes nonstudent male and female workers with at least a high school degree and 10 years or 
less of (potential) labor market experience.47  This experience restriction is imposed to track the 
rate of overeducation among recent college graduates.  I focus on the premium paid to those 
with exactly a college degree (college workers) over those with at least a high school degree, but 
no college degree (noncollege workers).48  Both part-time and part-year workers are included in 
the sample.49  I exclude workers who reported working zero weeks in the past 12 months, 
workers who reported working more than 98 hours per week, self-employed workers, and 
unpaid family workers.   
                                                 
46 In particular, I use the variable named occ2010.  For more information, please refer to IPUMS-
USA: https://usa.ipums.org.  
47 Potential labor market experience=min(age-yrsschool-7,age-17). 
48 By this definition, I estimate the college premium using workers who may have earned associate’s 
degrees or entered and attended college, but never earned college degrees. 
49 I control for full-time status when estimating premiums. 
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My earnings measure is the log real average weekly wage in 2013 dollars.50  Reported yearly 
wage incomes that fall in the 99.5th percentile in every state each year are topcoded.  I multiply 
any topcoded wage incomes by 1.45 following Katz and Murphy (1992).  Starting in 2008, weeks 
worked was reported in brackets.  I impute weeks worked in the 2008-2014 samples as the 
average of weeks worked in each bracket by sex in 2005-2007.51   
The means and standard deviations of variables I use to estimate the college premium on the 
sample I have constructed are presented in Table 1.  Overall, there has been little change 
between years.  There appears to be a slight decrease in real wages and the percentage of full-
time workers starting in 2008.  Between 2006 and 2013 there has been a very slight increase in 
the proportion of workers with a college degree and a slight decrease in the percentage of full-
time workers.  Although small, most of the differences in means between any two adjacent years 
of the variables listed in Table 1 are statistically significant at the 95% level.52 
I estimate the college premium for my sample using the following specification in every year: 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝐴𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐶𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝐹𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑠𝐻 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐻𝐹𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑈𝐸𝐻 + 𝛽7𝑈𝐸𝐻2 + 𝜀           
(1),  
where Y is the natural log of real average weekly earnings (in 2013 dollars).  I regress this 
variable on indicators for whether an individual has college degree, is female, is black, is 
Hispanic (non-black), is a full-time worker, and on a quadratic of potential work experience.  
The college premium in a given year is determined by the estimate of 𝛽1.  Estimates and 95% 
                                                 
50 I use the chain-weighted Personal Consumption Expenditures deflator (PCE). 
51 This approach is also used in Katz and Murphy (1992). 
52 Results of this exercise are available on request. 
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confidence intervals of the college premium are depicted in Figure 1.  The figure shows the 
college premium reaching exceeding .51 in 2005-2007, declining to .49 in 2008, and stagnating 
after 2009.  My findings are concordant with findings from the literature.  Namely, Gottschalk 
and Hansen (2003) find a premium of roughly .45 in 1995 and James (2012) shows that, the 
college premium for workers with only a bachelor’s degree (no advanced degree) has stagnated 
between 2000 and 2010. 
 
III. Methods 
a. Using Premiums in Every Year to Measure the Rate of Overeducation 
I follow the methodology of Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) to define whether an occupation 
is a noncollege or college occupation based on the magnitude of the college premium estimated 
for that occupation.  A college degree is one that pays college-educated workers a substantial 
premium while a noncollege degree is one that does not.  The threshold for determining whether 
a college premium is substantial is arbitrary.  Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) define a noncollege 
occupation to be one that pays below a .1 college premium.  In this paper, I consider multiple 
thresholds.  
Estimating a college premium for workers with exactly a college degree may not make sense 
for certain occupations (lawyers, e.g.).  Following Gottschalk and Hansen (2003), I first 
determine the occupations that fall into this category by calculating the percent of workers in 
every occupation with at least a college degree.  For this step, I include workers with at least a 
high school degree, workers with exactly a college degree, and also workers with an advanced 
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degree.  Any occupation that has an average of more than 90% workers with a college degree or 
higher is determined to be a college occupation.53  These occupations include physicians, 
pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, psychologists, aerospace engineers, chemists, special 
education teachers, lawyers. 
For the remaining occupations, I estimate the college premium paid to college workers with 
exactly a college degree.  In any year, I pool workers of any particular occupation with workers 
in that occupation from the previous year and one year ahead to avoid college premiums from 
fluctuating greatly between years but also to allow premiums to change over time.  Thus an 
estimate for a within-occupation college premium from 2007 would include workers in that 
occupation from 2006 and 2008.  I regress log real average weekly wage by year and occupation 
with dummy variables for females, full-time workers, whether the observation was from the 
previous year, whether the observation was from the year ahead, and a quadratic in potential 
experience.   
Some occupations using the IPUMS classification system are much smaller by employment 
(and observations) than others.  In order to generate precise estimates, I require each occupation 
for which I estimate a premium to have at least 50 college and 50 noncollege workers in every 
year.54  If an occupation does not meet this requirement in at least one year between 2006 and 
2013, I aggregate this occupation with similarly problematic occupations to the 3-digit 2010 SOC 
                                                 
53 I take the average percentage of workers with at least a college degree in an occupation across the 
2005-2014 ACS samples. 
54 That is, 50 college workers and 50 noncollege workers after pooling observations from the year 
before and the year after in every year from 2006 to 2013. 
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level.  Doing so allows me to retain and estimate premiums for the narrowly defined occupations 
using the IPUMS classification system.  Many occupations that were aggregated to the 3-digit 
2010 SOC level still did not have 50 college and 50 noncollege workers observed in every year 
between 2006 and 2013.  I aggregate these to the 2-digit 2010 SOC level.  Any occupations 
aggregated to the 2-digit 2010 SOC level that still did not meet my observation count 
requirement, were all pooled together into a miscellaneous category.  The observations in this 
miscellaneous category represent 1.1% of the entire sample.  This aggregation procedure 
provides me with 276 distinct occupations.  Of these, 49 are occupations that I define to be 
college ones based on employment (i.e., occupations that are made up of greater than 90% 
college graduates).  The remaining 227 occupations are ones for which I will estimate the college 
premium in in every year in 2006-2013. 
I calculate the rate of overeducation among workers with only a bachelor’s degree in each 
year in 2006-2013 by taking the number of these workers in occupations paying a low premium 
over the total number of workers in that year.  Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) consider 
occupations that pay a premium of less than .1 in log real weekly earnings to be noncollege 
occupations.  Occupations that pay a premium of less than .1 in 2006 include food processing 
workers, motor vehicle operators, massage therapists, postal service mail carriers, painters, and 
construction and maintenance workers.  I also consider premium thresholds of .15, .2, and .25 
for determining whether an occupation is noncollege.  The rates of overeducation in 2006-2013 
using these four thresholds are depicted in Figure 2. 
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The rate of overeducation using a .1 premium threshold in 2006 is quite small but 
harmonious with previous findings.55  When increasing the cutoff for defining an occupation as 
noncollege, the proportion of overeducated workers increases mechanically.  The findings from 
the .1, .15, thresholds are similar: there is an increase in the proportion of overeducated workers 
during the great recession peaking in 2009, and declining after.  This is different to the findings 
of Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) who find a secular decrease in the proportion of overeducated 
college workers between 1983 and 1994.  When setting the threshold to .2, the rate of 
overeducation is shown to decrease over time, while a setting a threshold of .25 indicates a slight 
increase.56  The components of these changes and the disparate results from the .2 and .25 
thresholds will be explored and reconciled in the following subsection. 
 
b. Between and Within Components of Changes in the Rate of Overeducation 
As illustrated in Figure 1, there was a statistically significant decline in the aggregate college 
premium between 2007 and 2008.  It could be that using a fixed threshold may detect an 
increase in the rate of overeducation because all occupations suffered a decline in the college 
premium.  If this is the case, the number of occupations classified as being noncollege may be 
greater in 2009 than in 2006.  A close examination of occupations and their yearly premiums 
                                                 
55 Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) finds a decline in the proportion of overeducated workers from 
roughly .09 to .03 between 1983 and 1994.  Because the aggregate college premium among workers with 
only a bachelor’s degree still increased after 1994, the rate of overeducation using a threshold of .1 in my 
time period may not be appropriately comparable and would likely understate the rate of overeducation 
compared to his findings. 
56 These findings are similar when also considering unemployment to be an occupation that pays no 
premium to workers with a college degree. 
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shows that the number of noncollege occupations increased between 2006 and 2009.  There 
were 8 noncollege occupations in 2006 and 13 noncollege occupations in 2009 when using a 
premium threshold of .1. 
While many occupations changed from college to noncollege between these years, there 
were others that did the reverse.  Following the aggregate trend in the college premium, there 
were 12 occupations that paid a premium of greater than .1 in 2006 but less than .1 in 2009.57  
However, there were also 7 occupations that did the opposite, paying a premium of less than .1 
in 2006 but greater than .1 in 2009.58  Thus, the results presented in Figure 2 depends on the 
number of noncollege occupations in each year and the proportion of college workers working 
in those occupations. 
Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) justify the flexibility for an occupation to offer a different 
premium in every year and possibly change from noncollege to college over time because of 
SBTC.  This line of reasoning may be appropriate for the length of time period in their study 
(1983-1994).  However, the growth in noncollege occupations I have documented between 2006 
and 2009 may not be due to a reverse of SBTC.  In fact, Hershbein and Kahn (2016) present 
evidence that SBTC was actually exacerbated during the financial crisis.  I thus explore how 
                                                 
57 The following are these occupations: life, physical, and social science occupations; surveying and 
mapping technicians; respiratory therapists; physical therapist assistants and aides; dental assistants; 
combined food preparation and serving workers, including fast food; food preparation and serving 
related workers (not elsewhere classified); maids and housekeeping cleaners; construction laborers; 
telecommunications line installers and repairers; hand packers and packagers. 
58 The following are these occupations:  food processing workers; purchasing agents, except 
wholesale retail, and farm products; agricultural and food science technicians; healthcare practitioners and 
technical occupations (not elsewhere classified); massage therapists; food preparation workers; 
bookbinders, printing machine operators, and job printers. 
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much the results in Figure 2 are driven by occupations fluctuating between being college or 
noncollege vs. the changes in the size of noncollege occupations by employment size.59 
In Figure 3, I show that changes in the rate of overeducation are largely due to the yearly 
reclassification of occupations as being college or noncollege.  Figure 3A plots the change in the 
share of overeducated workers using .1 as the premium threshold.  These are the year-to-year 
changes in the rate of overeducation of the line in Figure 2A.  The change in the share of 
overeducated workers between two adjacent years is due to what I define as changes of within 
and between shares, which I define below. 
Let 𝑂 be the set of all occupations.  In year 𝐹, let the set of college occupations be 𝑂𝑡,𝐶 and 
the set of noncollege occupations be 𝑂𝑡,𝑁, and the employment share of college workers in an 
occupation be 𝛾𝑖.60  The rate of overeducation in a given year is defined as: 
𝑂𝑈𝑡 ≡
∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡,𝑁𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡𝑖            (2). 
For two years 𝐹 = 0 and 𝐹 = 1, some occupations that are noncollege in year 0 are also 
noncollege in year 1.  Let the set of these shared noncollege occupations be 𝑂0,𝑁𝑠 and the 
remaining noncollege occupations unique to year 0 be 𝑂0,𝑁𝑢 .  Thus 𝑂0,𝑁 = 𝑂0,𝑁𝑠 ∪ 𝑂0,𝑁𝑢 , and 
𝑂0,𝑁𝑠 ∩ 𝑂0,𝑁𝑢 = ∅.  Also, let the set of noncollege occupations in year 1 that were college in year 
                                                 
59 To address this issue, Gottshalk and Hansen (2013) calculate the probability that each occupation 
pays a premium lower than .1.  College workers are then assigned these probabilities.  The aggregate 
probability that a worker with exactly a college degree receives a premium of less than .1 in a year is 
simply the (weighted) average of these probabilities.  Findings from this exercise are similar to the ones 
from Figure 2 and are presented in Appendix A. 
60  
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0 be 𝑂1,𝑁𝑢.  Similarly, 𝑂1,𝑁 = 𝑂1,𝑁𝑠 ∪ 𝑂1,𝑁𝑢, and 𝑂1,𝑁𝑠 ∩ 𝑂1,𝑁𝑢 = ∅.  The rate of overeducation in 
either year can then be decomposed as: 
𝑂𝑈𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡,𝑁𝑠𝑖∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡,𝑁𝑢𝑖∑ 𝛾𝑡,𝑖𝑂𝑡𝑖 = (𝑊𝐻𝐹ℎ𝐻𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)𝑡 + (𝐵𝑒𝐹𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)𝑡   (3) 
The change in the rate of overeducation between years 0 and 1 can then be calculated as the 
change in these components: 
∆𝑂𝑈0,1 = 𝑂𝑈1 − 𝑂𝑈0 = 
  [(𝑊𝐻𝐹ℎ𝐻𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)1 − (𝑊𝐻𝐹ℎ𝐻𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)0] + [(𝐵𝑒𝐹𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)1 − (𝐵𝑒𝐹𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)0]  = 
  Δ(𝑊𝐻𝐹ℎ𝐻𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒) + Δ(𝐵𝑒𝐹𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑖 𝑆ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑒)       (3). 
Thus the change in the within share is the portion of the change in the rate of overeducation 
due to employment changes in noncollege occupations that are defined as noncollege in both 
years.  The between change represents the change in the number of overeducated workers as a 
result of occupations being classified as noncollege in the first year and college in the next and 
vice versa.  Figure 3B plots within and between changes, and clearly demonstrates that much of 
the change in the share of overeducated workers is due to between changes.61 
The changes documented in Figure 2 may be from labor market shocks to within-occupation 
college premiums during the great recession.  Because the nature and function of many 
occupations are likely similar between 2006 and 2013, I use premiums calculated for 2006 only 
(using data from 2005-2007) to determine whether an occupation is college or noncollege for the 
                                                 
61 For each year, I use the preceding year as year 0. 
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entire period.62  This method shuts down between changes and will only highlight employment 
changes in noncollege occupations as defined by the premiums calculated for 2006.  I present 
findings using this method in Figure 4.  Relative to the rates illustrated in Figure 2, there has 
been substantially less movement in the rate of overeducation when shutting down between 
changes.  Depending on the threshold considered, the rate of overeducation has either remained 
stable or increased slightly between 2006-2013. 
  
IV. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have studied overeducation in the U.S. between 2006 and 2013.  This time-
frame is particularly interesting because it covers the period before, during, and after the great 
recession.  I employ a methodology introduced by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) that is less 
commonly utilized in the literature.  When replicating their method, I find that among workers 
with exactly a college degree, the proportion of workers with exactly a college degree working in 
occupations that paid very low college premiums increased during the great recession and 
decreased after.  Changes in the rate of overeducation could be due to an increase in the number 
of college-educated workers employed in noncollege occupations that were noncollege in the 
past or could be due to an increase in the number of noncollege occupations themselves.  I 
decompose shifts in the rate of overeducation to changes of within shares and between shares to 
show that much of the movement documented is due to changes in the between shares.  When I 
keep the classification of an occupation as college or noncollege constant over time, the rate of 
                                                 
62 I also consider estimating within-occupation premiums by pooling across all years, and the findings 
do not differ substantially from using within-occupations from 2006 only. 
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overeducation only exhibits a slight increase in this time period.  Either way, these findings run 
contrary to findings from previous research that show a general decrease in the rate of 
overeducation during the late 20th century.  They are, however, concordant with findings from 
O’Leary and Sloane (2014) who use the same methodology to document an increase in the rate 
of overeducation in the U.K. during the great recession. 
 The findings of this paper, while puzzling, may not be problematic.  There has been some 
evidence of SBTC occurring rapidly in some occupations during recessions in the past 25 years, 
even during the great recession (Hershbein and Kahn, 2016).  Thus one might expect within-
occupation premiums for college-educated workers to rise on average during the recession.  
However, I show that within-occupation premiums fell on average, and for some occupations so 
much that they would be classified as a noncollege occupation.  It could be that SBTC was not 
pervasive enough to increase within-occupation premiums overall.  Also, my narrowly defined 
occupations may still be broad enough to contain jobs requiring skilled and unskilled tasks, and 
the share of employment in jobs requiring unskilled tasks increased in this period.  My main 
suspicion, however, is that wage premiums estimated during the recession may simply not be 
well correlated with the actual productivity of college-educated workers.  A suggestion for future 
research would be to obtain better measures of worker productivity during the great recession. 
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Appendix A 
The measure of overeducation I use to produce Figure 2 relies on classifying an 
occupation as either being a noncollege occupation or not.  Thus the number of occupations 
classified as being noncollege could vary substantially from year to year simply due to noisy 
estimates of within-occupation premiums.  Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) address this by 
calculating the probability an occupation pays less than a given threshold.  Then an individual’s 
probability of being in a noncollege job is taken to be the probability that his or her occupation 
pays a premium less than that given threshold.  The aggregate probability of being in a 
noncollege occupation in a given year is simply the (weighted) average probability across 
individuals of being in a noncollege job.  The outcomes of this exercise are presented below.  
The findings are similar to Figure 2.  Namely, the trends from Figure A1, Figure A3, and Figure 
A4 match their Figure 2 counterparts.  The only exception is Figure A2 which unlike Figure 2B, 
shows no big increase during the great recession. 
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